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THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE SENATE AND
CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO ARMS CONTROL




This paper examines the role of the U.S. Congress, Senate and Presi-
dent in the negotiation, formation, interpretation, and termination of
treaties to which the United States is a party, focusing particularly on
arms control treaties. In Part I we outline the fundamental or "black-
letter" law with respect to treaties concluded under the President's au-
thority conferred by Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which requires
the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Most major arms control trea-
ties have taken this form. Part II analyzes the role of Congress, as op-
posed to the Senate, in the conclusion of treaties as Congressional-
Executive agreements. This alternative has not frequently been used for
arms control treaties, but it is being considered in connection with the
recent U.S.-Soviet bilateral chemical weapons agreement, and we argue
that this procedure may be used more frequently. Part III describes in
detail the formal record of Senate deliberations regarding arms control
treaties, and draws some tentative conclusions about the actual impact of
the Senate on those treaties and on the arms control negotiation process.
Part IV outlines the role of the political branches in the interpretation
and termination of treaties.
Our analysis is based primarily on the deliberations of the Senate
and Congress and on their formal actions. Of course, the formal record
does not tell the whole story. Senate and congressional influence on arms
control has been ubiquitous and important. The formal record reveals
the direction of that influence, but cannot show its precise impact. The
formal record also is the most authoritative contemporary source of con-
stitutional law relating to presidential, senatorial, and congressional pre-
rogative. In the absence of judicial decisions, the law can best be inferred
from the dialogue of the political actors most directly involved. Our pa-
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per will describe that dialogue and hopefully elucidate the lessons to be
drawn from it.
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW CONCERNING ARTICLE II TREATIES
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES'
Article II of the Constitution authorizes the President to "make"
treaties with the "advice and consent" of the Senate, provided two-thirds
of the Senators present concur. An Article II treaty may be a bilateral or
a multilateral international agreement, and is brought into force as an
international obligation of the United States by the formal act of ratifica-
tion or accession. This formal act (hereinafter called "ratification") is
separate from the act of signing the treaty and is accomplished pursuant
to an instrument executed by the President. Accordingly the Article II
Treaty Power is a Presidential power that requires Senate participation
prior to its exercise. As indicated below, U.S. constitutional law also
recognizes the legal authority of the President to conclude treaties on the
basis of authorization by majority vote of the Congress as a whole, either
in the form of general legislation or a joint resolution dealing specifically
with the agreement in question. International treaties concluded on the
basis of this constitutional procedure are known as Congressional-Execu-
tive agreements.
The decision to open a treaty negotiation, and the process of negoti-
ation itself, is exclusively a Presidential power. Congress, the Senate, or
individual Senators or members of Congress may influence the course of
a negotiation. For example, the record shows that Senator Pell, as a
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), was influ-
ential in stimulating negotiations leading to two minor arms control
agreements. In addition, Senator Jackson and the conservative wing of
the Congress clearly influenced the negotiation of SALT II as well as the
choice of constitutional procedure selected by President Carter to bring it
into force. More recently, the views of Senator Helms have undoubtedly
been taken into account as they represent an important conservative con-
stituency within the U.S. political culture. However, neither the Senate
nor the Congress has any constitutionally recognized role prior to the
submission of a treaty to the Senate or Congress for approval, and a
treaty may be concluded by the President and implemented on the basis
of prior general authorization.
1. This part has been adapted from Philip R. Trimble, The President and the Treaty Power, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (Kenneth L. Karst & Leonard W. Levy eds.
Supp. 1991).
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Current constitutional practice represents a conspicuous departure
from the original understanding of Article II, which says that treaties are
made with the "advice" as well as the "consent" of the Senate. That
language seems to envision Senate participation prior even to the negotia-
tion, and certainly before the conclusion of treaties. However, this un-
derstanding was quickly reinterpreted informally.2  In 1789, in
connection with an upcoming negotiation, President Washington person-
ally appeared before the Senate and asked its advice on a series of specific
negotiating questions. The Senate postponed consideration of all but one
such question to a second session. This procedure proved unsatisfactory
to both the President and the Senate, and was abandoned. Even the
practice initiated by President Washington of seeking written advice on
particular negotiating questions was abandoned by Washington before
the end of his first Administration. A congressional study reported that
"[b]y 1816 the practice had become established that the Senate's formal
participation in treaty-making was to approve, approve with conditions,
or disapprove treaties after they had been negotiated by the President or
his representative."' 3 An attempt in 1973 by Senator Hartke to affirm the
"historic" role of the Senate in treaty-making by constituting it as a
council of advice for that purpose came to naught in the face of Execu-
tive branch constitutional objections.4 Individual Senators or members
of Congress may nevertheless influence the course of negotiations infor-
mally through expressions of views at hearings, participation as advisers
to the U.S. delegation to a negotiation, and other informal methods.
If a negotiation produces an international agreement, the President
may submit the agreement as an Article II treaty to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification by a two-thirds vote. However, the
President is not constitutionally required to do so. Historical practice
has confirmed that there are three additional sources of authority for
Presidential conclusion of an international agreement on behalf of the
United States. 5 Accordingly the President must choose the most appro-
priate basis in domestic constitutional law for bringing the agreement
into force. Most importantly the President may seek congressional au-
2. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 98TH CoNG., 2D SEss., TREATIES AND OTHER INTER-
NATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 25-35 (Comm. Print 1984).
3. Id. at 36.
4. S. Res. 99, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 7274-75 (1973), was opposed by the
Department of State on the grounds that the consistent practice since Washington has been to con-
suit but not to use the Senate as a "Council of Advice." ARTHUR W. ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 172-76 (1973).
5. Treaties and Other International Agreements, in DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN-
UAL §§ 700-721 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Circular 175].
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thorization of an international agreement by majority vote of both houses
of Congress, by joint resolution or act of Congress, or he may use existing
legislation as a basis for ratification of the agreement. The use of these
Congressional-Executive agreements as an alternative to the Article II
procedure has become accepted as constitutionally equivalent to the Ar-
ticle II procedure.
In addition, an international agreement may be contemplated by an
earlier Article II treaty and derive its authority from the earlier treaty.
Such an agreement has the same legal force internationally and domesti-
cally as an Article II treaty. Finally, an international agreement may be
concluded on the basis of the President's foreign affairs power or the
Commander-in-Chief power. Many arms control treaties have been con-
cluded on the basis of this authority, although these treaties tend to deal
with consultation, notification, and relatively routine or non-controver-
sial matters. Nevertheless, those treaties, known as Presidential-Execu-
tive agreements, have the same effect internationally as an Article II
treaty or a Congressional-Executive agreement.
The State Department has promulgated a regulation, known as the
Circular 175 Procedure,6 which purports to guide the President's choice
of procedure to follow in bringing an international agreement into force.
This State Department regulation requires that due consideration be
given to such factors as the formality, importance, and duration of the
agreement, the preference of Congress, the need for implementing legisla-
tion by Congress, the effect on state law, and past U.S. and international
practice. Under Circular 175, officials of the Executive branch may con-
sult with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as to the choice of
constitutional procedure. The Circular 175 factors are rather general
and may sometimes suggest inconsistent choices, and probably do not
have much impact on actual Executive branch decisions. Rather, the
choice of constitutional procedure is basically a political choice.7 Histor-
ically, international agreements dealing with boundaries, arms control,
military alliances, extradition, and investment have normally been sub-
mitted to the Senate as Article II treaties, while international agreements
dealing with trade, finance, energy, fisheries, and aviation have normally
been concluded as Congressional-Executive agreements. Nevertheless,
there is no constitutional requirement that this general historical practice
be continued. In a departure from at least the general pattern of past
practice, the Bush Administration decided to treat the 1990 U.S.-Soviet
6. Id.
7. See infra part III.
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Chemical Weapons Agreement as a Congressional-Executive agreement.
Finally, an agreement may be concluded as an Article II treaty that is
"non-self-executing" and is therefore subject to the enactment of imple-
menting legislation by Congress prior to its ratification, thereby involving
both the Senate and the Congress as a whole.
If the President chooses to submit an international agreement to the
Senate as an Article II treaty, the Senate may consent to its ratification
subject to conditions that bind the President if he chooses to ratify the
treaty.8 Those conditions may require the President to attach a reserva-
tion to United States adherence to the treaty or to amend the treaty by
agreement with the other treaty party or parties. Senate-imposed condi-
tions may also require the President make a specified declaration to the
other treaty party or parties in connection with ratification; or a Senate-
imposed condition may state an understanding that the Senate seeks to
impose on the President or the U.S. courts, for example, an understand-
ing regarding a particular interpretation of the treaty's domestic effect.
The President normally includes Senate-imposed conditions requiring
agreement by, or communication to, the other treaty party or parties in
an instrument exchanged with the treaty partner or deposited specifically
in connection with ratification. However, the President has claimed the
constitutional power to comply with Senate-imposed conditions outside
the formal ratification process. 9
A Senate-imposed condition must relate to the subject matter of the
treaty and may not infringe other provisions of the Constitution, such as
the Bill of Rights or the President's foreign affairs power. President Rea-
gan took the position that a Senate condition attached to its resolution of
ratification for the INF Treaty was an unconstitutional incursion into the
President's foreign affairs power. His position was forcefully disputed.
In Missouri v. Holland,10 the Court upheld the validity of a treaty-
related act of Congress that arguably contravened the Tenth Amendment
absent the treaty. That Amendment protects the rights of each of the
fifty states comprising the United States. This decision caused considera-
ble concern that a treaty might supersede other constitutional provisions,
including the Bill of Rights. However, in Reid v. Covert, I1 a plurality of
justices opined that a treaty may not contravene an individual liberty
specifically protected by the Bill of Rights. Of course, the content of
such a right may be altered by the existence of a treaty and the foreign
8. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 133-36 (1972).
9. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 123-34 (1990).
10. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
11. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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location of the government activity. 12 Following the Senate's advice and
consent, the President makes an independent decision as to whether to
ratify the treaty, thereby bringing it into force as an international obliga-
tion of the United States, subject to the conditions imposed by the Sen-
ate. The President also exercises the power to accept or reject proposed
reservations by other parties to a treaty, without the participation of the
Senate.
II. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS' 3
Congressional-Executive agreements are international treaties that
are concluded on the basis of a general or specific act of Congress author-
izing the treaty. They have always been treated as constitutionally
equivalent to Article II treaties. As noted above, the decision as to which
alternative to select is a Presidential power, and the criteria for distin-
guishing the two alternatives are unclear at best. The choice in the end
seems to be a political choice made by the President. Major arms control
treaties have normally been concluded under Article II, and members of
the Senate have often expressed the view that major treaties must be so
concluded. However, the historical record does not support that
contention.
The earliest example of a congressional-executive agreement by
prior authorization occurred in 1792, when Congress passed legislation
authorizing the United States Postmaster General to enter into interna-
tional postal agreements.1 4 In the nation's first fifty years under the Con-
stitution, 1789-1839, sixty international agreements were concluded as
Article II treaties, while only twenty-seven international agreements
were concluded as executive agreements either with or without congres-
sional assent,' 5 i.e., as Congressional-Executive agreements or as Presi-
dential-Executive agreements. During the next fifty years, from 1839-
1889, the number of Article II treaties concluded, 215, roughly equaled
the number of executive agreements, 238.16 The number of executive
agreements concluded began to surpass the number of Article II treaties
12. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 495 U.S. 259 (1990); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
13. This part has been adapted from Jack S. Weiss, Comment, The Approval of Arms Control
Agreements as Congressional-Executive Agreements, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1533 (1991).
14. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 239; see also SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES:
THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 131-32 (2d ed. 1916); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans,
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements Interchangeable Instruments of Na-
tional Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 240 (1945).
15. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., supra note 2, at 36-40.
16. Id.
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during the period between 1889-1939. During this period, 917 executive
agreements were concluded, as opposed to 524 Article II treaties.
1 7
It has frequently been asserted that major agreements must be con-
cluded under Article II. However, the record does not support that con-
tention. Many of the executive agreements concluded during the
nineteenth century were of great importance to the nation. The treaty
finalizing the annexation of Texas, upon its rejection by the Senate, was
subsequently approved by a joint resolution of both houses of Congress; 8
this congressional action was upheld by the Supreme Court. 19 Likewise,
the annexation of Hawaii was accomplished by a joint resolution of Con-
gress after the Senate failed to ratify a treaty of annexation. 20 Clearly,
matters of great importance to the nation may be concluded as Congres-
sional-Executive agreements. Significant international agreements in the
early twentieth century were also approved as Congressional-Executive
agreements. After the Senate failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles,
ending World War I, Congress declared the end of the war by a joint
resolution; 21 Congress also passed a joint resolution approving the entry
of the United States into the International Labor Organization.
22
The use of executive agreements has grown dramatically in the
twentieth century. 23 The statistics show quite strikingly that the Con-
gressional-Executive agreement and the Presidential-Executive agree-
ment have eclipsed the Article II treaty as the dominant form of
international agreement in the United States in the modern era. From
1939 to 1982, the United States concluded 608 Article II treaties and
9,548 executive agreements. 24 In 1982 alone the United States concluded
17. Id.
18. 5 Stat. 797 (1845); see WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:
DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 62-67 (1941); Mc-
Dougal & Lans, supra note 14, at 263-64.
19. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
20. 30 Stat. 750 (1898); this method of annexation was approved by the Supreme Court in
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903). See also McCLURE, supra note 18, at 67-68; McDougal &
Lans, supra note 14, at 266-67.
21. 42 Stat. 105 (1921).
22. 48 Stat. 1182, 1183 (1934).
23. One commentator suggests three reasons for the explosion in the number of formal interna-
tional agreements to which the United States is a party:
First... is the growth in the number of nations in the world community. In 1945 there
were some fifty nations with which the United States concluded international agree-
ments.... Today there are closer to 150 nations in the world ommunity .... Second,
only in the period following World War II has the United States become a highly active
participant in world politics.... Third, there are many more subjects today that are part of
the international agreement making process than in years past.
Arthur W. Rovine, Separation of Powers and International Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J. 397,
406-07 (1977).
24. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., supra note 2, at 36-40.
1991]
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372 executive agreements and only seventeen Article II treaties:2 5
Moreover, historical practice does not support the argument that
defense-related agreements should take the form of Article II treaties.
26
One study of America's international agreements between 1946 and 1972
found that four percent of America's defense-related agreements during
this period took the form of Article II treaties, twelve percent were Presi-
dential-Executive agreements, and eighty-four percent were Congres-
sional-Executive agreements (by either prior statutory or subsequent
legislative authorization). 27 Moreover, this study found that while most
of the defense-related Article II treaties were "significant," a larger
number of the executive agreements met the same criteria for
significance.
28
Nevertheless, the record of United States-Soviet arms control over
the past thirty years shows that most United States-Soviet arms control
agreements29 have been concluded as Article II treaties. 30  However,
25. Id. at 38-39. "On January 1, 1983, the United States was a party to 966 treaties and 6,571
executive agreements in force."
26. LAWRENCE MARGOLIS, ExEcUTIvE AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN FOR-
EIGN POLICY (1986).
27. LOCK K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 58-59 (1984).
28. Id.
29. The record also displays a clear pattern of concluding multilateral arms control agreements
as Article II treaties. Examples include the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T.
701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; Limited Test Ban Treaty, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S.
43.
30. The United States was a party to eighteen nuclear arms control agreements as of 1986; of
these, 12 were Article II treaties, five were Presidential-Executive agreements, and one was a Con-
gressional-Executive agreement (the SALT I Interim Agreement). HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMM., SUBCOMM. ON ARMS CONTROL, INT'L SECURITY AND SCIENCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., FUNDAMENTALS OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 394-95
(Comm. Print 1986) (prepared by the CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.) [hereinafter FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL]. Senate consent to the multilateral Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material was followed by congressional approval of implementing legislation.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, Pub. L. No. 97-351, 96
Stat. 1663, 18 I.L.M. 1419; (1982) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 831, 1116 (1982)). Entry into force of
the Exchange of Notes Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Concerning the Direct Communications Link Upgrade (known as the Additional Hotline
Modernization Agreement) as a Presidential-Executive agreement was followed by congressional
enactment of legislation endorsing the agreement and authorizing necessary equipment for its imple-
mentation. Exchange of Notes Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics Concerning the Direct Communications Link Upgrade, July 17, 1984, United
States-USSR, Pub. L. No. 99-85, 99 Stat. 286, 23 I.L.M. 1393 (1985).
Recent United States-Soviet arms control agreements which have been concluded as Article II
treaties include: Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec.
8, 1987, United States-USSR, S. TREATY Doc. No. 11, 27 I.L.M. 90, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988);
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, May 28, 1976, United States-USSR, 15 I.L.M. 891; Threshold
Test Ban Treaty, July 3, 1974, United States-USSR, 13 I.L.M. 906.
Recent United States-Soviet arms control agreements which have been concluded as Presiden-
tial-Executive agreements include: Agreement on Principles of Implementing Trial Verification and
Stability Measures That Would Be Carried Out Pending the Conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet Treaty on
[Vol. 67:645
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there are three major congressional deliberations indicating that there is
no constitutional requirement that such agreements be concluded under
Article II. First, the executive and legislative branches expressly ac-
knowledged the constitutional equivalence of Congressional-Executive
agreements and Article II treaties during their deliberations leading to
the enactment of legislation authorizing the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency. Second, one of the major arms control treaties of the
1970s-the SALT I Interim Agreement-is a solid precedent for con-
cluding future arms control agreements as Congressional-Executive
agreements. Third, the decision to submit SALT II as an Article II
treaty shows that the nature of the decision is political, since the SALT I
Interim Agreement and SALT II were quite similar in terms of coverage,
importance, and duration. The congressional debate of these three mat-
ters provides the strongest evidence, in the absence of judicial decision, of
the current understanding of the constitutional prerogatives of Congress,
the Senate, and the President in the conclusion of arms control treaties.
A. Section 33
Congress enacted the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of
196131 to create the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Con-
gress's purpose was "to provide impetus toward [the goal of reducing the
risk of war] by creating a new agency of peace to deal with the problem
of reduction and control of armaments looking toward ultimate world
disarmament." '
32
Section 33 of the Act provides in part that:
[N]o action shall be taken under this chapter or any other law that will
obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed
Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the
treaty making power of the President under the Constitution or unless
authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the
United States.3
3
the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Sept. 23, 1989, United States-USSR, 28
I.L.M. 1434; Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises, Sept. 23,
1989, United States-USSR, 28 I.L.M. 1436; Agreement Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experi-
ment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Sept. 23, 1989, United
States-USSR, 28 I.L.M. 1438; Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, May 31, 1988, United States-USSR, 27 I.L.M.
1176; Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, Sept. 15, 1987, United
States-USSR, 27 I.L.M. 76.
For the contention that the Article II, § 2 process is inadequate for United States-Soviet arms
control, see George Bunn, Missile Limitation: By Treaty or Otherwise? 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1970).
31. Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1988).
32. Id.
33. 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1992).
1991)
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
This provision's apparent equation of "the treaty making power of the
President under the Constitution" with "further affirmative legislation by
the Congress" has been cited by members of Congress for the proposition
that Article II treaties and Congressional-Executive agreements repre-
sent equally appropriate means of approving arms control agreements. 34
Since a Congressional-Executive agreement represents the enactment of
"further affirmative legislation" authorizing the President to bring an in-
ternational agreement into force, the plain language of section 33 does
equate Article II treaties and Congressional-Executive agreements.
The legislative history of the section 33 proviso does not undermine
this reading of the statute. It suggests that Congress was focusing pri-
marily on an effort to restrict the President's ability to conclude arms
control agreements as Presidential-Executive agreements. The section 33
proviso was added to the ACDA bill by a floor amendment offered by
Representative L. H. Fountain during House consideration of the bill on
September 19, 1961. Representative Fountain told the House that
[t]his amendment is designed to insure that on the subject of arms con-
trol no President... will ever take any action that is not in conformity
34. See 134 CONG. REC. H1683-84 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (memorandum to the House For-
eign Affairs Committee from the Counsel to the Clerk of the House of Representatives) (inserted in
the Record by Rep. Fascell); id. at H1681-83, H1685 (statements of Reps. Fascell and Berman).
During House consideration of a resolution urging the Senate to ratify the INF Treaty, Rep.
Dante Fascell contended that a letter from the State Department's Deputy Legal Adviser supported
the proposition that, under § 33, Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements represent
equally appropriate means of approving arms control agreements. The Deputy Legal Adviser wrote:
Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act provides that the President may not
obligate the United States to reduce or limit U.S. armaments except pursuant to the treaty-
making power or unless authorized by further legislation. Neither the Act nor the Constitu-
tion dictates which of these two options the President should exercise with respect to a particu-
lar agreement.
Id. at H1684 (State Department Deputy Legal Adviser's memorandum regarding the form of sub-
mission of arms control agreements) (inserted in the Record by Rep. Fascell) (emphasis added).
This passage suggests that the Bush Administration considers Article II treaties and Congres-
sional-Executive agreements to be equivalent alternatives; it does not suggest that the Bush Adminis-
tration considers § 33 to be unconstitutional or invalid.
The Bush Administration's then-nominee to be Legal Adviser to the Department of State seems
to have endorsed the validity of § 33 during his confirmation hearings. In response to a question by
Sen. Joseph Biden asking whether "a joint resolution is sufficient and it [the chemical weapons agree-
ment] is not required to be treated as a treaty obligation," Edwin D. Williamson responded, "Yes
.... In the arms control and disarmament agreement [sic] that is contemplated as an alternative
process." Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Transcript of Confirmation Hearing of Edwin D.
Williamson to be Legal Adviser to the Department of State 32, Aug. 1, 1990 (provided by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter Williamson Hearing].
See also Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreement" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 329-30, 339-43
(statement of J. Fred Buzhardt); John A. Boyd, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 375, 391-98 (1978) (State Department and Senate Foreign
Relations Committee decide that nonbinding political statements by the United States and the Soviet
Union endorsing continued adherence to the SALT I Interim Agreement do not implicate § 33; this
indicates that the State Department does not question the validity of § 33).
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with the Constitution... the President cannot under this amendment
commit America to [an arms reduction proposal], except pursuant to
the treaty-making power under the Constitution, or by affirmative leg-
islation by both the House and the Senate. It forbids a President act-
ing on his own.
3 5
The Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative
Thomas E. Morgan, told the House that his committee would accept
Representative Fountain's amendment, and the amendment was incorpo-
rated into the bill without objection.36
During House consideration of a motion to go to conference with
the Senate to reconcile differences between House and Senate versions of
the bill, Representative Fountain repeated his concern that "there... be
no reduction or limitation of arms except in keeping with the treaty-mak-
ing power of the President under the Constitution, or unless there is
other affirmative legislative action on the part of the Congress."
37
The House-Senate conference committee agreed to leave Represen-
tative Fountain's amendment in the final version of the bill. The House
bill's Conference Report then made an entirely different, and unrelated,
point:
The managers on the part of the Senate accepted the proviso with the
understanding that its language does not interfere in any way with the
President's authority to control the size of U.S. Armed Forces under
existing law. The managers on the part of the House concurred in this
interpretation of the proviso.
38
Neither the House nor the Senate floor debate on the approval of the
conference report reveals much information about congressional under-
standing of the section 33 proviso or about the Senate's position that the
proviso "does not interfere in any way with the President's authority to
control the size of U.S. Armed Forces under existing law."' 39 It would
appear that the Senate conferees were concerned with maintaining a
Presidential prerogative, not with asserting a Senatorial prerogative, and
they implicitly accepted a congressional role equal to that of the Senate.
Senator John Sparkman, floor manager of the conference report on
the ACDA bill, told the Senate that the proviso "did not appear in the
Senate bill because it was implicitly assumed that such was the case in
any event. The House conferees, however, believed that it was useful to
35. 107 CONG. REc. 20,309 (1961) (statement of Rep. Fountain).
36. Id. (statement of Rep. Morgan).
37. Id. at 20,537 (statement of Rep. Fountain).
38. H.R. REP. No. 1263, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1961).
39. The House debate is found at 107 CONG. Rac. 20,898-906 (1961); the Senate debate is
found id. at 21,042-46.
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spell this assumption out, and we agreed." 4
The paucity of section 33's legislative history should allow us to in-
terpret its terms-and the Senate's statement in the conference report-
in a manner which simply gives effect to the plain meaning. The record
of congressional consideration of the ACDA bill reveals widespread con-
cern that, during the height of the Cold War, creation of the new arms
control agency could enable the President to strike bargains with the So-
viet Union that would damage United States national security.4' A su-
perpower arms control agreement was an unknown quantity in 1961,
and, after the missile gap and other Cold War scares, many members of
Congress and the public might have feared that the new agency would
aid the President in unwisely limiting United States nuclear and other
military capabilities.42 As such, Representative Fountain's amendment
may well have been understood by members of Congress to assure that
no such Presidential-Executive agreements would be concluded. Never-
theless, in the course of making that point, the amendment articulated an
assumption-in plain and easily understood language, and which the
Senate accepted-about the equivalence of Congressional-Executive
agreements and Article II treaties.
Two years after the enactment of the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Act of 1961, the Senate debated and passed legislation which would
have removed the following language from section 33-"pursuant to the
treaty-making power of the President, under the Constitution, or unless
authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the
United States"-and replaced it with the following language-"in ac-
cordance with the constitutional processes of the United States."'43 This
Senate action and the accompanying debate indicate that the Senate rec-
ognized that its acceptance of the section 33 proviso demonstrated Senate
acceptance of the equivalence of Article II treaties and Congressional-
Executive agreements in arms control.
The sponsor of the proposed language, Senator Frank J. Lausche,
argued on the floor of the Senate that:
My fear is that the language now in the bill creates a fuzzy situation
which might be interpreted as meaning that the President, instead of
40. Id. at 21,043. Arguably this remark indicates that Sen. Sparkman accepted the equivalence
of Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements.
41. The House debate on the ACDA bill begins id. at 20,249 (1961); the Senate debate begins
id at 17,649 (1961).
42. On United States strategy in 1961 and the years preceding, see MCGEORGE. BUNDY, DAN-
GER AND SURVIVAL (1988); LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY
(1981); JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT (1982).
43. S. 777, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REc. 10,958 (1963).
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proceeding by way of treaty, may proceed by way of agreement, and
thus require only a majority vote of both Houses of Congress, instead
of a two-thirds vote of the Senate, as the Constitution requires in con-
nection with the making of treaties.44
The House Foreign Affairs Committee rejected the Senate's pro-
posed amendment to section 33.45 During later Senate consideration of
the same legislation (which no longer contained the proposed amend-
ment to section 33), Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J.
William Fulbright submitted a statement for the Record which con-
tended that "[lt has always been understood by the committee and the
Senate that major agreements ... would be submitted as treaties whereas
minor agreements.., would not." 46 It would appear that this subse-
quent deliberation in the Senate confirms the plain meaning of the Foun-
tain amendment.47 Whatever the value of post hoc agreed explanations
of legislative intent,48 Senator Fulbright's unilateral and disputed inter-
pretation seems unpersuasive, especially in light of Senator Lausche's
stated reason for proposing his amendment.
More recently, Senators Claiborne Pell and Jesse Helms, the Chair-
man and ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, appear to have endorsed section 33 in a letter to President
Bush urging the President to submit the United States-Soviet Chemical
Weapons Agreement to the Senate as an Article II treaty. The Senators
wrote that "we wish to stress ... the legal requirement (under section 33
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act) that no arms control agree-
ment be undertaken without congressional approval... .,49 Their letter
also stressed that a "significant international obligation" such as the
chemical weapons agreement be concluded as an Article II treaty.
B. SALT I Interim Agreement Debate
The SALT I debate referred to the same issue and arrived at the
same conclusion. The SALT I negotiations between the United States
44. Id. at 10,958.
45. H.R. REP. No. 863, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See also To Amend the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963); 109 CONG. REc. 22,507-08 (statement of Rep. Morgan).
46. 109 CONG REc. 22,613 (1963).
47. For an argument that the above post hoc legislative action indicates that the principal mean-
ing of § 33 is the restraint of unilateral Presidential action in arms control, see Raymond Celada, Is
Congressional Approval of the SALT I Interim Agreement Required? (Sept. 8, 1977) (unpublished
memorandum prepared by the Congressional Research Service) (on file with the authors).
48. The Supreme Court has denied effect to such explanations. Fourteen Diamond Rings v.
United States, 183 U.S. 176, 180 (1901).
49. Letter from Senators Claiborne Pell and Jesse Helms to President George Bush (May 29,
1990) (on file with the authors).
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and the Soviet Union produced two arms control agreements in 1972: the
ABM Treaty, which limited each side's ability to construct strategic de-
fenses; and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, which
limited for five years the number of each side's intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
President Nixon submitted the ABM Treaty to the Senate for its advice
and consent to ratification. He submitted the Interim Agreement to both
the House and the Senate for approval by a joint resolution.50
The Nixon Administration did not offer Congress a detailed legal
justification for the bifurcated congressional consideration of the SALT I
agreements or for its decision to submit the Interim Agreement to both
houses of Congress. At only one point in the SALT I record did a mem-
ber of Congress press an Administration representative for the legal ra-
tionale for House consideration of the Interim Agreement:
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is not clear to me [what] the relationship
between the treaty and the Interim Agreement is or why the House is
involved in the process of approval.
Of course, it is good for our own self-esteem to be brought into a
problem like this that normally would fall to the lot of the Senate.
This is called an Interim Agreement. Does this have anything to do
with an executive agreement? It is called interim because it is not sub-
stantial enough to be called a treaty; is that it?
Secretary Rogers. That is correct. But it is an agreement of con-
siderable importance. It relates to the treaty for obvious reasons, rea-
sons I mention in the statement.
Therefore, they should be acted upon together. We did not sub-
mit the Interim Agreement to Congress because of congressional self-
esteem, but we think it is a matter of national interest, and we think
the House should give full consideration to the agreement and in a
sense to the treaty itself, although, as you point out, you do not have
the power of ratification. But they are of such significance, these two
agreements, that we felt it was desirable to have full consideration by
Congress.
I think it was a wise decision.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is a peculiar role for the House.
You spent most of the time talking about the treaty, which, in
theory, has no relationship to our immediate responsibilities, yet the
Treaty is so bound up with the Interim Agreement that you couldn't
50. In President Nixon's letter of transmittal of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement to
Congress, he asked for "the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expres-
sion of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive
Arms." H.R. Doc. No. 311, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), reprinted in Joint Resolutions to Consider
Approval of Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" Hear-
ings Before the House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 117 [hereinafter House SALT I
Hearings].
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appreciate the agreement without understanding what the treaty
provides.
Secretary Rogers. That is correct.
I suppose we could have proceeded on the basis that it was only
necessary to get ratification of the treaty and the agreement could be
signed by the President without any congressional authority, but we
decided that was not the wise course to follow for the reasons I
mentioned.
You are correct. They are linked together.51
Secretary Rogers's testimony seems confused. On the one hand, he
indicates that the Interim Agreement was submitted to both houses of
Congress because it was not substantial enough to be a treaty. This un-
dercuts the case for Congressional-Executive agreements. Furthermore,
Secretary Rogers contends that the Interim Agreement could have been
approved as a Presidential-Executive agreement, thus bypassing Con-
gress altogether. On the other hand, Secretary Rogers indicates that the
Interim Agreement is of "considerable importance" and "such signifi-
cance," and is intimately linked to the ABM Treaty. Given this rhetoric,
it is not clear why such a "matter of national interest" does not rise to
the level of significance supposedly reserved for Article II treaties.
President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger
contended that the limited duration and limited scope of the Interim
Agreement justified its submission to Congress as a Congressional-Exec-
utive agreement. 52 While the agreement itself was slated to expire in
51. House SALT I Hearings, supra note 50, at 17-18.
52. President Nixon distinguished the Interim Agreement from the ABM Treaty by reference
to its limited duration at a SALT briefing for members of Congress at the White House on June 15,
1972. The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), Including an Associated
Protocol, Signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 391 (1972) (Appendix: The White House-Remarks of the President at a
Congressional Briefing on the Arms Limitation Treaty and Agreement, June 15, 1972).
The President referred to the Interim Agreement as "the Executive Agreement, which is indi-
cated as being.., not a permanent agreement-it is for five years--and not total. It covers only
certain categories of weapons." Id. at 392.
The following exchange between National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger and Rep. Otis
Pike occurred at a White House briefing Dr. Kissinger conducted for members of Congress follow-
ing President Nixon's remarks. It illustrates that the limited duration and scope of the SALT I
Interim Agreement were key factors in the Nixon Administration's decision to submit the agreement
to Congress as a Congressional-Executive agreement:
Congressman Pike. Dr. Kissinger, if I understand the philosophy whereby one of
these agreements requires a treaty and the other is an executive agreement, it has to do
with the fact that the executive agreement is limited to a term of years. As we look ahead
to SALT II ... [flor how long a period of years could an executive agreement be made
which was not required to be a treaty? Could it be for 25 years, for example?
Dr. Kissinger. [This] is an important Constitutional question: At what point does an
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1977, the offensive ceilings it established were likely to be codified in a
subsequent SALT II agreement; in fact, the duration of the Interim
Agreement was extended by a nonbinding political agreement between
the United States and the Soviet Union in 1977. This nonbinding polit-
ical agreement was later superseded by the SALT II agreement in 1979
which, although never ratified, was adhered to by both sides. Therefore,
the actual offensive limitations reached during the SALT I negotiations
were anything but temporary, and were not contemplated as only
temporary.
The Interim Agreement was arguably limited in scope because it did
not include restrictions on bomber-carried nuclear weapons or an impor-
tant category of long-range missiles-those with multiple independently
targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The exclusion of bomber-carried nu-
clear weapons and MIRVs from the Interim Agreement certainly made
the agreement less comprehensive than many hoped at the time. Still,
the limitations on ICBMs and SLBMs represented significant restrictions
on both sides' nuclear arsenals, especially since these ceilings endured
beyond their slated five-year lifespan, and because the ABM Treaty
would not have been agreed to in the absence of a companion offensive
accord. In this sense, the scope of the Interim Agreement cannot be said
to be limited.
executive agreement achieve character of such permanence that it should really more prop-
erly be in the form of a treaty?
There were two reasons why the executive agreement was put into that form. One was
because of its limited duration and secondly because of its limited scope. That is to say,
here we had an agreement, the major categories of which were going to be included again
in a more comprehensive negotiation leading to a more permanent arrangement.
For example, the disparity which is involved for a limited period of time might not
prove acceptable for a more permanent arrangement.
For this reason, that is to say the limited duration and the limited scope, it was de-
cided that an Executive Agreement which, however, is submitted to the entire Congress,
was more appropriate.
If you got to the point where you made a 25-year agreement, I don't want to prejudge
that issue, but, as a political scientist and not as a presidential assistant, it would look more
like a treaty to me. But I don't want to get into that.
Id. at 407 (briefing by National Security Adviser Kissinger).
Secretary of State William P. Rogers testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that "[t]he offensive arms limitations are temporary and not comprehensive. They do not cover all
strategic delivery vehicles. For example, strategic bombers, where the U.S. already has a very large
advantage, are not limited by the interim agreement." Id. at 9.
Other key SALT I officials had different understandings of why the Interim Agreement was
submitted to Congress as a congressional-executive agreement. According to Paul Nitze, a SALT I
negotiator, "[t]hough not a formal treaty like the ABM treaty, which required the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, the SALT I Interim Agreement nonetheless needed congressional approval before
it could take effect, as mandated by a provision in the 1961 Arms Control and Disarmament Act."
PAUL NrTZE, FROM HIROSHIMA TO GLASNOST 332 n.3 (1989).
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C. SALT H
The SALT II Treaty, which President Carter and Soviet leader Leo-
nid Brezhnev signed on June 18, 1979, established numerical limits on
ICBMs, SLBMs, and bomber-delivered nuclear weapons, banned the
construction of certain new ICBM launchers, imposed qualitative con-
straints on the development of new types of missiles, and limited the
number of warheads which existing missiles could carry. In essence,
SALT II began with the foundations established by the SALT I Interim
Agreement and added more specific and detailed limitations.
Although the SALT II Treaty was not designated an "interim"
agreement, its duration was expressly short-term. The provisions out-
lined above were to remain in force until the end of 1985, and a protocol
to the treaty prohibiting the testing and deployment of mobile ICBMs
was to remain in force only until the end of 1981. The treaty expressly
contemplated the adoption of a more restrictive arms control regime af-
ter the treaty's expiration in 1985. These attributes of SALT II closely
mirror the attributes of the SALT I Interim Agreement, since both agree-
ments were short-term and both covered the same subject. Therefore,
this diminishes further the persuasiveness of the argument that the SALT
I Interim Agreement's limited duration set it apart from Article II trea-
ties and made it an appropriate subject for a Congressional-Executive
agreement, and that duration is determinative of an arms control agree-
ment's proper form.
SALT II is perhaps best remembered for being one of the first casu-
alties of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; in the wake of this invasion,
further Senate consideration of the treaty was terminated. What is less
well remembered about SALT II is that the Carter Administration had
considered submitting the agreement to Congress as a Congressional-Ex-
ecutive agreement rather than as an Article II Treaty.53 The United
States SALT II delegation was even instructed to change the heading at
the top of the draft SALT II agreement to reflect this possibility. 54
Statements by President Carter and chief United States arms control
53. See James MacGregor Burns, Jimmy Carter's Strategy for 1980-Leader or Born-Again
Broker?, ATLANTic MONTHLY, Mar. 1979, at 41, 42 ("[1If a SALT agreement is blocked or emascu-
lated in the upper chamber, [President Carter] will ask both House and Senate for a simple majority
vote of approval; and if this approval is not forthcoming, he will on his own authority as Chief
Executive observe the terms of a SALT agreement as long as he is President."); Robert G. Kaiser,
Selling SALT to the Senate, WASH. PosT, May 28, 1978, at A1, A19; see also Chronology ofSALT II
Negotiations, 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1179, 1182 (1979); David E. Rosenbaum, The 95th Con-
gresv" No Sweeping Changes, 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2999, 3016 (1978).
54. Robert G. Kaiser, Byrd Warns Administration SALT Pact Must Be a Treaty, WASH. POST,
Aug. 26, 1978, at A2.
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negotiator Paul Warnke that the Administration was considering submit-
ting SALT II to Congress as a Congressional-Executive agreement at-
tracted the attention of key Senators."5 These Senators immediately went
on the political offensive, and some Senators who supported SALT II
called for Senate opposition to a resolution approving SALT II as a Con-
gressional-Executive agreement in order to protect the Senate's institu-
tional prerogatives.
Apparently fearing that a SALT II Congressional-Executive agree-
ment would thus fail in the Senate, the Carter Administration decided
not to submit SALT II to both houses as a Congressional-Executive
agreement, but rather to the Senate exclusively as an Article II treaty.
56
The Carter Administration did so for political reasons; this decision was
not based on a legal interpretation or opinion.
The SALT II experience demonstrates that the political process is
the forum for defining constitutional and institutional prerogatives when
international agreements are approved by Congress. In contrast to the
fate of the SALT I Interim Agreement, the executive branch, the Senate,
and the House did not reach a political accommodation to conclude the
SALT II agreement as a Congressional-Executive agreement. The Sen-
ate exercised its considerable political influence with the White House
over the form of the agreement, and the White House acceded to the
Senate's demands. The House does not appear to have participated in
this political battle, and thus its interests were not vindicated by the final
result. On the basis of these three deliberations, it seems entirely reason-
able to conclude that arms control agreements, like other agreements,
may be legitimately concluded by the President on the basis of congres-
sional authority as an alternative to the Article II process.
III. THE SENATE RECORD OF DELIBERATIONS REGARDING ARMS
CONTROL TREATIES
In this Part we examine the formal approval record and lay the em-
55. See Kaiser, supra note 54; see also John Robinson, Baker to Tell Soviets of Hill Doubts on
SALT Ratification, WASH. PosT, Jan. 7, 1979, at A20; Carter Is Warned on SALT Treaty, WASH.
POsT, Aug. 25, 1978, at A6.
56. See Edward Walsh, Carter View ofSALT Linked to Soviet Restraint, WASH. POST, Feb. 24,
1979, at A28 ("Last year, the White House deliberately encouraged speculation that a new SALT
accord might be submitted to Congress as an executive agreement rather than as a treaty. But that
idea provoked heavy congressional opposition and Carter later ruled it out.").
One critic of arms control agreements later somberly observed, "[in 1979], approval of the
[SALT II] treaty was seen as so doubtful President Carter considered making the treaty into an
Executive agreement. This tactic, however, was strongly opposed by the Senate leadership as inap-
propriate and rightly so. The authority and constitutional duty of the Senate were at stake." 132
CONG. REC. S9069 (daily ed. July 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Quayle).
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pirical basis for some of our intuitions and conclusions about the role of
the Senate in the arms control treaty process. This Part will examine the
record of Senate consideration of the fifteen nuclear arms control agree-
ments to which the U.S. is a party and which have been concluded with
Senate approval (many modem arms control agreements have been con-
cluded as Presidential-Executive agreements). By examining the Senate's
debates and related committee action, we may get a better view of the
Article II process and the role that the Senate has played. (This Article
was written prior to ratification of the START Treaty in October, 1992.)
In arms control negotiations individual Senators have regularly par-
ticipated as advisors or observers on the negotiating team. They have
participated in the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty, Limited Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, Environmental Modification
Treaty, SALT II, INF, and START. In addition, there are two treaties
(the Seabed Treaty and the Environmental Modification Convention) as
to which Senator Pell, an influential member of the Foreign Relations
Committee, has claimed credit for proposing the conclusion of a treaty
on the points covered. The formal record unfortunately does not disclose
the actual influence of Senators on the course of a negotiation. The exec-
utive branch no doubt has often viewed their participation as helpful in
assuring eventual Senate approval. Our intuition is that individual Sena-
tors participating in the negotiation do not seem to have caused major
changes in policy or negotiating positions, although their views are un-
doubtedly listened to with respect, and it seems likely that there are
many cases where their expressed concerns are accommodated. For ex-
ample, during the Nuclear Test Talks, thirty-four Senators sent a letter
to the delegation urging the achievement of specific negotiating objec-
tives. Those objectives were met and Senator Helms's contribution was
recognized by the chief U.S. negotiator.
More significantly, the Senate or Congress can have a major impact
in shaping defense policy: by curtailing programs such as SDI, which in
turn impacts arms control negotiations; and through legislation such as
the Jackson amendment, which imposed significant political constraints
on the SALT II negotiations. In addition, the formal record of Senate
deliberations reveals a relatively clear and consistent pattern of concern
over the effect of treaties on U.S. military preparedness, including con-
cern over the ability of the United States to continue nuclear testing, and
over the availability of nuclear weapons for NATO and for use in war.
The record also reflects a strong distrust of the Soviet Union and the
need to guard against its perfidy, especially in the repeated emphasis on
verification. Moreover, some of the proposed reservations debated in the
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Senate, such as that requiring on-site inspection in the Limited Test Ban
Treaty (LTBT), were undoubtedly implicitly understood as a repudiation
of dealing at all with the U.S.S.R. In this way the influence of the Senate
has regularly reflected the influence of the conservative wing of the U.S.
political spectrum. Although this influence has not usually been imposed
in a formal sense, such as through required reservations to treaties, it has
no doubt played a significant role in the preparation and evolution of
U.S. negotiating positions. The Senate has also regularly expressed its
views on questions regarding Constitutional prerogatives in the treaty-
making process with respect to related developments, such as possible
amendments to a treaty or Presidential-authorized national commit-
ments. Those views supplement the dialogue described above in connec-
tion with section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act and the
SALT I and II debates.
We should preface our discussion with a word on terminology. As
noted at the beginning of the paper, the Senate does not formally ratify or
approve treaties. Instead, it votes its advice and consent to the Presi-
dent's ratification of the treaty. The legislative vehicle through which the
Senate typically acts is the resolution of ratification. In the following
discussion, when Senators propose amendments, understandings, and
reservations to a treaty, they are technically proposing alterations in the
Senate's resolution of ratification.
A. The Antarctic Treaty
The first nuclear arms control agreement to which the United States
became a party was the Antarctic Treaty. Senators Carlson and McGee
served as congressional advisers to the U.S. delegation, and thus actually
participated in the negotiations. Senator McGee later delivered a floor
address relating his first-hand knowledge of the negotiations; this address
was singled out for praise by Senator Fulbright. The treaty was signed
on December 1, 1959 by the United States and eleven other countries,
including the Soviet Union. The treaty was transmitted to the Senate on
February 15, 1960. The main purpose of the treaty was to ensure that
Antarctica (or any part of the continent) did not become the sovereign
territory of any nation, and that the continent be dedicated to peaceful
purposes. Article I of the treaty prohibited any military use of Antarc-
tica; Article V prohibited "[a]ny nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the
disposal there of radioactive waste material." Article IV of the treaty
froze the ability of states to make claims of sovereignty regarding any
part of the continent. The arguable national security implications of Ar-
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ticle IV were the most contentious aspects of the ensuing Senate ratifica-
tion debate. Interestingly, the positions taken by Senators regarding
Article IV echo the later debates regarding more substantive arms con-
trol agreements.
The major issues which arose at the SFRC's treaty hearings con-
cerned the Soviet Union. Treaty opponents argued that the pact gave the
Soviets something for nothing-the United States, they asserted, had a
more legitimate claim to sovereignty in Antarctica as a result of extensive
U.S. scientific investigation than did the Soviet Union. Treaty opponents
also raised claims which foreshadowed later debates over strategic arms
control verification, contending that the Soviets could not be trusted to
live up to their commitments and that the Soviets might still one day use
Antarctica as a secret military base. Finally, treaty opponents objected
to the codification of Soviet access to Antarctica at all.
The Senate's floor debate saw many of the same issues raised. In
addition, Senator Engle made the argument that the treaty was inimi-
cable to U.S. interests because the pristine and isolated Antarctic conti-
nent was a perfect place for U.S. nuclear testing and the disposal of
American nuclear waste. During the floor debate, Senator Engle moved
that the Senate delay its consideration of the treaty by six months. The
Senate defeated the Engle motion 56-29. The Senate then approved its
resolution of ratification by a vote of 66-21.
B. Limited Test Ban Treaty
The LTBT was signed on August 5, 1963, by the U.S., the U.K., and
the U.S.S.R., and was then opened for the signature of all nations. The
LTBT permanently prohibited all atmospheric, outer space, and under-
water nuclear explosions. It was transmitted to the Senate on August 8,
1963.
The SFRC held joint hearings with the Senate Armed Services and
Atomic Energy Committees in late August, 1963. Senators pressed Ad-
ministration representatives for their views on whether the U.S. could
continue to test and develop its nuclear weapons adequately without
above ground detonations. Senators also pressed for assurances that the
U.S. could verify Soviet compliance with the treaty. Finally, Senators
who both supported and opposed more comprehensive restrictions on
nuclear testing inquired as to whether the LTBT signalled that U.S. pol-
icy was now to pursue a comprehensive test ban treaty. The SFRC re-




Senate floor debate on the LTBT began in September, 1963, and the
general debate covered the same issues which had been raised at the hear-
ings. The Senate then considered many proposed reservations and
amendments.
Senator Russell proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratifi-
cation which would have provided that any subsequent amendment to
the treaty must be approved by two-thirds of the Senate. The Russell
amendment was offered out of concern that Article II of the treaty,
which provided the means for the signatory parties to amend the treaty,
might have allowed amendment of the treaty by either Presidential-Exec-
utive agreement or Congressional-Executive agreement.58 After debate,
Senator Russell proposed an alternative to his reservation in the form of
adding a preamble to the Senate's resolution of ratification underlining
the Senate's Article II advice and consent function.59 This proposal rep-
resented an attempt to satisfy the concerns of Senators regarding the con-
clusion of amendments to the LTBT by other than the Article II process,
but in a less direct and intrusive manner than a reservation, amendment,
or understanding. The Senate approved the Russell preamble 79-9.60
Senator Tower proposed two reservations. One would have re-
quired the President to delay depositing the treaty's instrument of ratifi-
cation until the treaty had been revised to provide for on-site
inspection.61 The Senate defeated the on-site inspection reservation 76-
16.62
The other Tower reservation would have required the President to
delay depositing the treaty's instrument of ratification until he deter-
mined that the U.S.S.R. had paid its U.N. dues. Senator Miller also of-
fered a reservation which would have delayed U.S. ratification of the
treaty until the U.S.S.R. paid its U.N. debt.63 He withdrew his amend-
ment after debate, and the Senate instead voted on Senator Tower's sec-
ond reservation. The Senate defeated the U.N. dues reservation by a vote
of 82-11.64
Senator Goldwater proposed a reservation which would have
delayed U.S. ratification "until the [U.S.S.R.] has removed all nuclear
57. 109 CONG. REc. 16,525 (1963).
58. Id. at 16,847-49.
59. Id. at 17,745.
60. Id. at 17,755.
61. Id. at 17,455.
62. Id. at 17,734.
63. Id. at 17,730.
64. Id. at 17,732.
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weapons, all weapons capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and all So-
viet military and military technical personnel from Cuba;" the Goldwa-
ter reservation further provided that U.S. ratification should be delayed
until the completion of an inspection of Cuba verifying the total Soviet
pullout.65 The Goldwater reservation was debated on the Senate floor,
with opponents arguing that it was totally irrelevant to the question of
above ground nuclear testing, and possibly not even germane under Sen-
ate rules.6" Goldwater told the Senate, "[ilt has been said that the reser-
vation which I propose is not germane to the treaty. I say that the
comment is not germane to my reservation." 67 The Senate rejected the
Goldwater reservation 75-17.68
Senator Mundt proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratifica-
tion which expressed the sense of the Senate that with regard to future
international agreements to which the U.S. is an original signatory, when
such agreements "become effective only when ratified by certain specified
parties, it should be the position of the United States that no other coun-
try should be permitted to sign or accede to such treaty or amendment
until it shall have been ratified by such specified parties."'69 The intent of
the Mundt amendment was to free the Senate from "the argument that to
reject a treaty already signed by so many [nations] would virtually be
considered by them as an act of bad faith and a breach of international
understanding. °70 After making his speech, Senator Mundt withdrew
his amendment. 7
1
The Senate then considered Senator Long's reservation which as-
serted that "the treaty does not inhibit the use of nuclear weapons in
armed conflict" (the reservation was actually offered by Senator Tower at
Senator Long's request). 72 Senator Tower argued that a perhaps inadver-
tent, but serious, ramification of the LTBT would be a prohibition on the
use of nuclear weapons during times of war, since, presumably, nuclear
weapons used during combat would be exploded above ground.
Many senators asserted that the treaty did no such thing; the treaty,
they claimed, was understood by the parties to cover peacetime nuclear
testing, and was not relevant to wartime use. Furthermore, many oppo-
nents of this reservation contended that, under international law, treaties
65. Id. at 17,713.
66. Id. at 17,716-19.
67. Id. at 17,714.
68. Id. at 17,723.
69. Id. at 17,723.
70. Id. at 17,727-28.
71. Id. at 17,729.
72. Id. at 17,734.
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such as the LTBT were suspended during wartime. As the debate was
winding down, Senator Holland offered an amendment to change the na-
ture of the proposal before the Senate from a reservation to an under-
standing; the Senate accepted the Holland proposal. 73 The Senate then
tabled the understanding.74 The Senate approved the LTBT's amended
resolution of ratification 80-19.7
5
C. Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) was signed by sixty nations, includ-
ing the United States and the Soviet Union, on January 27, 1963. The
main purpose of the OST was to set aside space for peaceful uses; the
treaty specifically prohibited the placement of nuclear weapons in space.
It was transmitted to the Senate on February 7, 1967.
Senators Aiken and Gore served as advisers to the U.N. Committee
on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the multinational body which formu-
lated the policy proposals which led to the treaty. Senators Church and
Case served on the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly which voted
to approve the OST and recommend it to member nations. According to
U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, "in the very negotiations them-
selves I was materially benefitted by having two members of Congress on
the House side, Chairman George Miller of the Committee on Science
and Astronautics, and Representative James Fulton, come to Geneva,
and they participated in the negotiations which culminated in the formu-
lation of this treaty. '
'76
SFRC consideration of the OST was by and large noncontroversial.
The only remotely contentious issue was whether the treaty might limit
transmissions from U.S. communications satellites; there were potential
first amendment and national security components to this issue. Senator
Gore expressed his interest in a Senate reservation which would have
made explicit the Senate's concerns relating to this satellite communica-
tions issue, but no such reservation was ever formally proposed. 77 SFRC
reported the treaty unanimously and without reservation on April 14,
1967. The Senate approved the resolution of ratification of the treaty 88-
0 after a cursory debate.7
8
73. Id. at 17,741-45.
74. Id. at 17,745.
75. Id. at 17,832.
76. Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1967).
77. Id. at 33.
78. 113 CONG. REc. 10,687 (1967).
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D. Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, Protocol II
The Treaty of Tlatelolco created a nuclear free zone in Latin
America and prohibited parties from acquiring nuclear weapons. There
are two protocols to the treaty. Additional Protocol I was intended to be
signed by states which had territories within Latin America; their agree-
ment to Protocol I required them to abide by the treaty's nuclear free
provisions. Additional Protocol II was intended to be signed by the
world's nuclear weapon states; it requires them not to contribute to the
violation of the treaty and not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against
Latin American nations. (The U.S. understood Protocol II to extend its
obligations to the territories of Protocol I signers.)
The United States signed Protocol II in April, 1968; its submission
to the Senate was delayed while the executive branch waited to see
whether the parties to the treaty understood and accepted the under-
standings issued by the U.S. when it signed the protocol (these under-
standings related to issues such as transit rights). Protocol II was
submitted to the Senate in August, 1970.
SFRC held short, noncontentious hearings. At these hearings,
Nixon Administration representatives requested that the Senate include
certain understandings in its resolution of ratification. Senators did not
oppose the Administration's proposal. SFRC reported Protocol II to the
full Senate 13-0 on March 30, 1971.
In its resolution of ratification, the full Senate incorporated the un-
derstandings requested by the Administration. These understandings ex-
pressed the following U.S. positions:
1) the U.S. did not accept the unilateral territorial claims of the
treaty parties relating to their territorial seas;
2) the U.S. reserved military transit and transport privileges;
3) the pledge of nonuse of nuclear weapons against Latin American
nations would be considered void in the event of an attack by a
Latin American nation party which received assistance from a nu-
clear weapon state (reflecting U.S. concerns about Cuba); and
4) the U.S. could carry out peaceful nuclear explosions on behalf of
Latin American nations party to the treaty.79
The Senate approved the resolution of ratification 70-0.80
79. 117 CONG. REc. 10,353 (1971).
80. Id. at 10,745.
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E. Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, Protocol I
As noted above, Protocol I required nations with territorial posses-
sions in Latin America to apply the nuclear free provisions of the treaty
to those territories. The Carter Administration signed Protocol I on
May 26, 1977. At the time of signing, U.S. territories covered under
Protocol I included Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guantanamo,
and the Panama Canal Zone (which would cease to be U.S. territory for
the purposes of Protocol I upon its return to Panama under the Panama
Canal Treaty).
The SFRC conducted hearings on Protocol I on August 15, 1978,
and on September 15 and 22, 1981. The Carter Administration recom-
mended that the Senate incorporate the following understandings as part
of its resolution of ratification:
1) The understandings incorporated into the Senate's resolution of
ratification for Protocol II should apply here as well;
2) U.S. transit rights would not be interfered with by U.S. ratifica-
tion of the Protocol; and
3) the Protocol does not affect U.S. positions on freedom of the seas
issues or passage rights.8'
While the Carter Administration submitted Protocol I to the Senate
for its advice and consent in 1978, the Senate did not approve its resolu-
tion of ratification until the early days of the Reagan Administration in
1981. According to Senator Percy, the Senate delayed its approval "not
because of any substantive problem with the protocol itself, but because
of a dispute between the committee and the executive branch regarding
access to a letter from the National Security Council to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.. .. [and] that dispute is clearly moot with the change in Admin-
istration." 2 The Senate approved the resolution of ratification 79-0.83
F. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) involved a grand bar-
gain between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states. Under
the NPT, non-nuclear states agreed to forego the development, produc-
tion, and acquisition of nuclear weapons; the nuclear nations in turn
agreed to provide assistance with peaceful nuclear programs. The NPT
provided for International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspec-
81. Treaty of Tatelolco: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1978).
82. 127 CONG. REc. 27,420 (1981).
83. Id at 27,421.
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tions of nuclear facilities. The NPT additionally required the nuclear
states to agree to pursue arms control; nuclear states were also prohibited
from transferring weapons technology to non-nuclear states.
The United States signed the NPT on July 1, 1968. During the
negotiations there were extensive consultations with Congress.8
4
The SFRC held extensive hearings which delved into issues such as
the spread and development of nuclear weapons technology throughout
the world, the efficacy of IAEA safeguards, and the impact of the NPT
on U.S. national security. SFRC voted to approve the NPT 14-0, with
one member voting "present."
The full Senate began consideration of the NPT on March 7, 1969.85
The following issues were the subject of the most pointed debate and of
various legislative proposals related to the Senate's resolution of ratifica-
tion. Immediately before the conclusion of the international negotia-
tions, the U.S. and the U.N. Security Council issued statements which
were later debated extensively in the Senate. In effect, the U.S. and Se-
curity Council declarations related that, in the event of the threat of ag-
gression by a nuclear state against a non-nuclear signatory, immediate
assistance would be sought from the Security Council. In the view of the
SFRC (as expressed in its report), "the Security Council Resolution and
the Security Guarantee declaration made by the United States in no way
either ratify prior national commitments or create new commitments. '8 6
On the floor of the Senate, some Senators argued that these two declara-
tions would in fact require the U.S. to come to the defense of a non-
nuclear signatory in the event of aggression by a nuclear power. They
argued that the U.S. statement was designed to encourage reluctant non-
nuclear states to sign the treaty, and that the form of encouragement was
a tacit pledge to come to their defense. Chairman Fulbright told the
Senate that "I want to repeat... that the committee has made it unmis-
takably clear in its report that the Security Council resolution in question
and the U.S. declaration are separate and distinct from the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty. 87
Senator Ervin proposed a reservation to the resolution of ratification
which would insure that the U.S. "does not obligate itself by this treaty
to use its armed forces to defend any non-nuclear-weapon state or any
member of the United Nations against any acts or threats of aggression
84. See 115 CONG. REc. 5751 (1969) (statement of Senator Gore).
85. Id. at 5608.
86. Id. at 5738 (1969) (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 5739.
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.... "88 An extended debate between Senators Fulbright and Ervin fol-
lowed.8 9 The Senate tabled the Ervin reservation by a vote of 61-30.90
Senator Ervin made a second legislative proposal regarding the "commit-
ment-to-defend" issue. This second proposal tracked the language of Er-
vin's first reservation and added the understanding that "this treaty does
not affect in any way any obligation assumed by the United States under
any other treaty or the Charter of the United Nations." 91 The Senate
defeated this understanding 69-25.92
Some Senators questioned whether the NPT might adversely affect
U.S. policies and responsibilities relating to NATO. A colloquy between
Senators Spong and Fulbright addressed these issues; they contended
that the NPT did not prohibit the U.S. from stationing nuclear weapons
in NATO countries as long as the U.S. retained final control over their
use. They also told the Senate that the NPT would not place any other
restrictions on the ability of the U.S. or other NATO members to fulfill
their alliance responsibilities.
93
Senator Tower proposed a reservation to the Senate's resolution of
ratification which provided that the NPT not preclude "the provision of
weapons or other materials for the establishment of nuclear defenses to
regional organizations established under Article 52 of the Charter of the
United Nations." 94 Senator Tower was concerned that, in the event of a
crisis, the U.S. would be prevented from providing allies (such as NATO
members) with nuclear weapons. In response, Senator Fulbright argued
that the McMahon Act already prohibited the U.S. from transferring
control over nuclear weapons to other nations; that the NPT had a thirty
day exit clause; and that, under both international law and common
sense, all bets would be off in the event of a severe crisis or war anyway.
The Senate defeated the Tower reservation 75-17.95
Senator Dodd introduced an understanding that an attack against
any country by a nuclear state party to the treaty would be considered a
violation of the treaty.96 In essence, the Dodd understanding was offered
as a response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Dodd's position
was that non-nuclear nations signed the NPT in part out of a sense that
88. Id.
89. See memos at Id. at 5745.
90. Id. at 5893.
91. Id. at 6343.
92. Id. at 6344.
93. Id. at 6186-87.
94. Id. at 6194.
95. Id. at 6206.
96. Id. at 6208-09.
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the nuclear nations would aid them in the event of aggression by other
nuclear nations-or that, at least, in such circumstances, non-nuclear na-
tions might require nuclear defenses. The Senate defeated the Dodd un-
derstanding 81-15.
97
A second understanding offered by Senator Dodd provided that the
U.S. would "deposit its instrument of ratification simultaneously with the
Soviet Union, at a time to be agreed upon."98 The Senate defeated Dodd
II 79-15.99
Senator Thurmond proposed an understanding which mandated
that the "[t]reaty will be construed in accordance with the answers given
by the United States in response to certain questions by other members of
[NATO] ... ." 100 These answers indicated the understanding of the U.S.
government (communicated to NATO allies) that the NPT would not
interfere with U.S. NATO obligations, in particular those concerning nu-
clear weapons. For instance, although the NPT prohibits the "transfer"
of nuclear weapons, the statements made to the NATO allies by the U.S.
indicates the American understanding that what the NPT actually pro-
hibits is the transfer of control of nuclear weapons. Under this logic, the
U.S. intended to continue to transfer its nuclear weapons in Europe from
the territory of one NATO nation to another without violating its under-
standing of the NPT. The Senate defeated the Thurmond understanding
77-17.101
Senators expressed the concern that the treaty's provisions regard-
ing peaceful nuclear cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear states
could lead the U.S. to aid the commercial ventures of other nations and,
in effect, aid the foreign competitors of U.S. firms. Senator Fulbright
told the Senate that "the committee states its satisfaction with the assur-
ances of the administration ... that article V will not result in an open-
ended subsidy of commercial interests." 10 2 The Senate approved the res-
olution of ratification by a vote of 83-15.103
G. Seabed Arms Control Treaty
The Seabed Treaty prohibited the placement of nuclear weapons on
the ocean floor. Submarines do not fall within the coverage of the treaty,
97. Id. at 6331.
98. Id. at 6332.
99. Id. at 6337.
100. Id. at 6337.
101. Id. at 6340-41.
102. Id. at 5739.
103. Id. at 6380.
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but nuclear mines anchored to the ocean floor do. According to Sena-
tor Pell, the treaty's genesis lies in a Senate resolution which he spon-
sored; this initiative was then promoted at the U.N., and Senator Pell
served as a delegate to the U.N. body which voted to commend the treaty
to members.' °4 Senator Mathias also served as a delegate to the U.N.
Committee on Disarmament.
0 5
SFRC consideration of the treaty was pro forma, and the committee
reported the treaty unanimously. Senate floor consideration was also pro
forma; the Senate approved the resolution of ratification by a vote of 83-
0.106
H. ABM Treaty
The ABM Treaty, which limited U.S. and Soviet strategic defenses,
was signed by President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev on May 26,
1972. President Nixon transmitted the treaty to the Senate on June 13,
1972, and SFRC held hearings in June and July.
Senator Buckley proposed an understanding which provided that
the failure to reach a more comprehensive SALT agreement in five years
would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Senator
Fulbright countered that Buckley's proposal (like Senator Jackson's pro-
posals) was based on the faulty premise that the Interim Agreement did
not in fact provide for strategic parity. Senator Buckley withdrew his
understanding after short debate.10 7 The Senate approved the resolution
of ratification of the ABM Treaty by a vote of 88-2.10
I SALT I Interim Agreement
Senate floor consideration of the interim agreement was marked by
Senator Jackson's and the leadership's constant jockeying regarding the
possibility of a filibuster. The Senate finally voted for cloture 76-15.109
Senator Jackson offered an amendment to the resolution of ratifica-
tion which expressed the view of Congress that
were a more complete strategic offensive arms agreement not achieved
within the five years of the interim agreement, and were the
survivability of the strategic deterrent forces of the United States to be
threatened as a result of such failure, this could jeopardize the supreme
national interests of the United States . . . Congress . . . urges and
104. 118 CONG. REC. 3953 (1972).
105. Id. at 3958.
106. Id. at 3958.
107. Id. at 26,701.
108. Id. at 26,770.
109. Id. at 30,622.
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requests the President to seek a future treaty that ... would not limit
the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior
to the limits provided for the Soviet Union .... 110
The Jackson amendment also expressed the view of Congress that the
achievement of a more comprehensive arms control agreement was de-
pendent upon a vigorous American research and development effort.
Jackson's proposal reflected his assessment that the interim agreement
provided for inequitable levels of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, and
that future agreements should assure equality in every respect of the per-
missible superpower arsenals. The debate surrounding this amendment
crystallized the lurking conservative opposition to detente, and the ulti-
mate adoption of the Jackson amendment no doubt had a significant con-
servative effect on U.S. arms control policy.
Senator Hughes offered an amendment to Jackson's amendment,
which provided that the achievement of a more comprehensive arms con-
trol agreement was also dependent upon "the preservation of longstand-
ing U.S. policy that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States
should seek unilateral advantage by developing counter-force weapons
which might be construed as having a first-strike potential."' 
Senator Muskie offered two amendments to the Jackson amendment
which would have stricken the Jackson amendment's reference to "infer-
ior" levels of strategic forces and instead pledged the U.S. to seek an
agreement which would maintain "an overall equality" measured by a
variety of criteria. 112 The Senate rejected the first Muskie amendment
55-35.113 Senator Fulbright offered a substitute to the Jackson amend-
ment providing that "Congress supports continued negotiations to
achieve [arms control agreements] on the basis of overall equality, parity,
and sufficiency, taking into account" various factors.'1 4 The Senate de-
feated the Fulbright substitute 48-38.115 Senator Symington offered an
amendment to the Jackson amendment which would have removed the
word "intercontinental." The Senate defeated the Symington amend-
ment 51-38.1 16 The defeat of these liberal amendments clearly signalled
the strength of conservative skepticism about the direction set by the
President in arms control negotiations.
Senator Javits offered a cosmetic amendment to the Jackson amend-
110. Id. at 27,050.
111. Id. at 27,738. The Senate does not appear to have acted on this amendment.
112. Id. at 29,833-34.
113. Id. at 30,646. The Senate does not appear to have acted on the second Muskie amendment.
114. Id. at 30,623.
115. Id. at 30,632.
116. Id. at 30,637-38.
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ment which was accepted by voice vote." 17 The Senate then approved the
Jackson amendment 56-35.1 Is The requirement of equal limits no doubt
significantly constrained U.S. negotiating positions.
Senator Mansfield offered an amendment to the resolution of ratifi-
cation announcing that Congress endorsed the U.S.-Soviet Declaration of
Basic Principles of Mutual Relations. This declaration was signed by
Nixon and Brezhnev when they signed the ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement, and foreshadowed the decade of detente.' ' 9 The Senate re-
jected Senator Mansfield's motion to table his own amendment 52-31,120
and then approved the Mansfield amendment 84-1.121
Senator Saxbe proposed an amendment expressing the view of Con-
gress that the U.S. should not seek to develop first-strike weapons and
that the U.S. and the Soviets should seek Senator Saxbe's vision of "stra-
tegic equality."' 122 Senator Brooke offered an amendment expressing the
sense of the Congress that the fulfillment of the principles endorsed by
the superpowers in the Mutual Declaration required that neither side
pursue the development of a first-strike potential. 23 The Senate accepted
the Brooke amendment by voice vote. The Senate approved the joint
resolution approving the interim agreement 88-2.124
J. IAEA Safeguards Agreement
The IAEA Safeguards Agreement between the United States and
the IAEA places American civilian nuclear facilities under the interna-
tional safeguards of the IAEA. The agreement was approved by the
IAEA on September 17, 1976, and was submitted to the Senate on Feb-
ruary 9, 1978. The agreement served to implement the U.S. commitment
stemming from the NPT to subject American civilian nuclear facilities to
international inspection.
The SFRC reported the treaty unanimously to the full Senate with
five understandings which, according to Senator Church, "will resolve
[certain ambiguities about domestic implementation of the treaty] with-
out touching U.S. obligations under the treaty."'
25
The five understandings were as follows:
117. Id. at 30,638.
118. Id. at 30,649.
119. Id. at 27,930-31.
120. Id. at 29,499.
121. Id. at 29,727.
122. Id. at 28,675. The Senate does not appear to have acted on the Saxbe amendment.
123. Id. at 30,654.
124. Id. at 30,665-66.
125. 126 CONG. REC. 18,487 (1980).
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1) the agreement provided that the president should notify the
IAEA of his determination that a given nuclear facility does not
have a significant national security function and thus may be subject
to inspection; the first understanding required the president to notify
Congress as well, and gave Congress a sixty day period within which
to pass a resolution of disapproval;
2) the President shall consult with industry in advance of determin-
ing which facilities should be declared off-limits in order to protect
industrial interests;
3) a formal interagency mechanism shall be established to set and
coordinate relevant policy;
4) in the event that the NRC (an independent agency) and the ad-
ministration (the State Department in particular) could not agree on
policy, the view of the Administration shall prevail;
5) "the Agreement shall not be construed to require the communi-
cation to the [IAEA] of 'Restricted Data' controlled by the provi-
sions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954." 126
The Senate approved the agreement 90-0.127 The legal effect of these
understandings, which deal with domestic matters related to, but not
part of, the treaty, does not seem to have been discussed.
K Nuclear Materials Convention
The 1980 Nuclear Materials Convention establishes international
standards for the shipment and storage of nuclear materials; the conven-
tion grew out of concerns about international terrorism. The Senate ap-
proved this multilateral agreement 98-0 after pro forma debate.
128
L. Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed by the U.S. and
the Soviet Union in 1974; it restricted the superpowers from conducting
nuclear tests over 150 kilotons. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET) was completed in 1976; it was intended to prevent the super-
powers from surreptitiously gaining testing knowledge by conducting so-
called peaceful nuclear explosions (neither side has conducted a peaceful
nuclear explosion for nearly twenty years), and provided for verification
of the yields of these explosions. President Bush and Soviet leader
126. Id. at 18,486.
127. Id. at 18,494.
128. 127 CONG. REC. 18,632 (1981).
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Gorbachev signed new verification protocols for the TTBT and PNET at
their June, 1990 Washington summit, and the treaties were then submit-
ted to the Senate.
The Reagan Administration had opposed implementation of the two
agreements for many years, but in 1986 announced its intention to find
an appropriate solution to the verification concerns of conservatives.
SFRC held hearings on the treaties in 1987, and "ordered [them] re-
ported with a reservation providing for a presidential certification on ver-
ification."' 129 The Senate added this condition at the request of President
Reagan. 130
Senator Helms then initiated a letter to the Administration recom-
mending that negotiators at the nuclear testing talks attempt to gain So-
viet agreement on certain intrusive verification techniques. In all, thirty-
four senators signed the Helms letter, and endorsed its call for verifica-
tion through the CORRTEX system, thus effectively derailing further
Senate consideration of the agreements.
In 1991 the SFRC held hearings following the conclusion of the new
verification protocols. At these hearings, in an apparent reference to the
Helms letter, ACDA Director Ronald Lehman commented,
I believe that when this committee completes its work it will be able to
report that we set out to achieve two verification protocols of the high-
est quality and that we were successful in that endeavor. This was not
done in isolation from the legislative branch. Rather, it was done with
the closest consultations.
1 3
The verification protocols satisfied the stringent verification requirements
requested in the Helms letter.
Before the SFRC reported the treaties, Chairman Pell asked ACDA
Director Lehman to confirm that:
Your testimony in explanation of the meaning of the treaties and the
obligations they entail, along with that of other Executive branch wit-
nesses and materials submitted for the record, can be regarded as au-
thoritative, and that the Senate can expect the Executive branch to
regard itself as bound to interpret and implement the Treaties in ac-
cord with these representations without the need for the Senate to in-
corporate such interpretations in its resolution of ratification.'
3 2
According to Senator Nunn, Mr. Lehman replied satisfactorily to each of
these concerns.1
33
129. 136 CONG. REC. S13,703 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Pell).
130. 136 CONG. REc. S13,716 (1990).
131. Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties with the USSR.: Hearings
Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990).
132. 136 CONG. REC. S13,710 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990).
133. Id. at S13,711.
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The SFRC reported a resolution of ratification for the TTBT which
included a declaration. According to the resolution of ratification, the
Senate gave its advice and consent to the TTBT
subject to -
I. The declaration that to ensure the preservation of a viable deter-
rent there should be safeguards to protect against unexpected political
or technical events affecting the military balance... as follows:
Safeguard "A"
The conduct ... of nuclear test programs ....
Safeguard "B"
The maintenance of modem nuclear laboratory facilities and
programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology ....
Safeguard "C"
The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear
test activities prohibited by treaties should the United States cease
to be bound to adhere to such treaties.
Safeguard "D"
' * . research and development programs to improve our
treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.
Safeguard "E"
a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical
capabilities and operations ....
II. The declaration that... the United States shares a special respon-
sibility with the Soviet Union to continue the bilateral Nuclear Testing
Talks to achieve further limitations on nuclear testing .... 134
The Senate approved the two treaties 98-0.135
M. Environmental Modification Treaty
The Environmental Modification (or "Enmod") treaty prohibits
states from "engag[ing] in military or any other hostile use of environ-
mental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State
Party" (Article I). The treaty does not prevent the use of environmental
modification techniques for peaceful purposes.
Senator Pell stated that the treaty resulted from another initiative by
him. According to Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Pickering,
This convention ... resulted in large part from the action by the Sen-
ate in July 1973 in adopting Senate Resolution 71 - which Senator
Pell had introduced the year before ... Senator Pell also participated
in the negotiating process at the Conference of the Committee on Dis-
armament and at the United Nations which led to the successful con-
clusion of the convention and the recommendation by the General
134. Id. at S13,767-68. The Office of the Secretary of Defense endorsed the safeguards declara-
tion. Id. at S13,712.
135. Id. at S13,767.
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Assembly that it be opened for signature. This is an excellent example
of a constructive initiative in the legislative branch leading to a useful
outcome in the field of foreign affairs. 
136
The SFRC heard testimony regarding the treaty on October 3, 1978
and May 10, 1979. The only opposition to the convention presented to
the SFRC came from U.S. environmental groups, which favored
strengthening the terms of the treaty. James Barnes, in testimony given
as the representative of a coalition of environmental groups, suggested
that the Senate incorporate the following understanding into its resolu-
tion of ratification:
The Senate takes note of the assurance provided by the Secretary of
State that the present Administration will begin [within six months of
ratification] a review of the Convention .... It is the sense of the
Senate that further steps should be considered by the U.S. Government
... which would make the Convention more effective...1 37
Assistant Secretary Pickering and Senator Pell both told Mr. Barnes
that, in their view, attaching an understanding or reservation to the Sen-
ate's resolution of ratification would be inappropriate and could lead to
needless international complications and confusion. They contended
that a better means to make the statement in question would be to in-
clude it in the committee's report. 38 The Senate approved the resolution
of ratification for the convention after a pro forma debate by a vote of 98-
0.139
N INF Treaty
The SFRC and SASC held extensive hearings on the INF Treaty in
January and February, 1988. A persistent issue involved whether the
Administration was certain of the number of SS-20s in the Soviet arsenal,
and whether government estimates of the number of warheads which SS-
20s could carry had been accurate over the past decade.
Senator Helms pressed Administration representatives on the issue
of whether the treaty provided for the destruction of warheads, rather
than only missiles, and focused on the fear that the Soviets could reuse
their INF warheads. As he told Ambassadors Glitman and Kampelman,
"[a] missile is the carrying case and the warhead is the thing that goes
'boom,' and kills you. A missile itself does not kill you unless it falls on
136. Environmental Modification Treaty: Hearings Before the Comm on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1978).
137. Environmental Modification Techniques: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1979).
138. Id. at 20-21.
139. 125 CONG. REC. 33,818 (1979).
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you and cracks your head open."''4 The ambassadors responded that
while parts of warheads would be destroyed under the terms of the
treaty, to safeguard each side's bomb designs and to protect the environ-
ment, the fissionable materials and certain other components would not
be destroyed. 141 As part of his overall concern that the Soviets might
cheat on the agreement, Senator Helms told his SFRC colleagues.that he
"filed in the Senate an amendment that would require the United States
to withdraw from this treaty in the event of a major violation by the
Soviet Union."
142
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle recommended
that SFRC consider certain amendments and reservations to the treaty
which he assured the committee would not be killer amendments, but
rather would be helpful clarifying amendments. For instance, Perle ar-
gued, "[a] reservation that states simply that article 14 [of the treaty,
which deals with noncircumvention] entails no obligations, not otherwise
specified elsewhere in the treaty ... could be readily accepted by [the
Soviets]." More significantly, Perle recommended that the committee
adopt an amendment which would permit non-nuclear ground-launched
cruise missiles (GLCMs).
143
On February 22, Senator Helms wrote a letter to President Reagan
in which he threatened to delay the Senate's confirmation of William
Burns to be the new director of ACDA unless, among other demands,
the Administration provided him with an ACDA study on U.S. INF
verification capabilities. One week later, the Administration and Helms
reached an agreement whereby the Administration acceded to Helms's
demands and Helms agreed to allow Burns's nomination to go
through. 144
Senator Pell noted at the beginning of the SFRC's first markup ses-
sion that the committee potentially faced thirty-nine amendments and
four conditions. 145
Senator Helms offered two amendments which would have ex-
empted conventionally-armed GLCMs from coverage in the treaty; most
arms control experts agree that it would be impossible to distinguish be-
tween conventional and nuclear cruise missiles without actually physi-
cally examining the warhead in question. The committee defeated the
140. The INF Treaty: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Part 1 at 120 (1988) (hereinafter INF Treaty].
141. Id. at 120-23.
142. Id. Part 3 at 3.
143. Id. Part 3 at 7.
144. Arms Control Reporter 1988, 403.B.654-55.




Senator Helms considered offering an amendment which would
have provided that remotely-piloted vehicles did not fall under the terms
of treaty,147 and one which would have provided that "hypervelocity
glide vehicles" were not covered by the treaty.
14
Senator Helms considered offering another amendment which
would have changed the upper limit of missile range covered in the treaty
from 5,500 km to 7,000 km. 149 Senator Helms offered an amendment
which would have provided that the Soviet Scud-B (which had an esti-
mated range of 300 kin, below the INF Treaty threshold of 500 km) was
an INF missile and hence covered.'1 0 The committee defeated the
amendment 12-2.151
Senator Pressler offered an amendment which would have prevented
the President from bringing the treaty into force unless he certified that
there was parity between U.S. and Soviet conventional forces in Europe;
the committee voted against the amendment 15-2.152 Senator Pressler
offered a revised version of this amendment which would have prevented
the President from bringing the treaty into force until he certified that
whatever imbalances in U.S. and Soviet forces did exist would not impair
NATO security; the committee defeated the second Pressler amendment
15-2. 153 Senator Pressler then offered another amendment which would
have prevented the President from bringing the treaty into force until he
certified that the Soviet Union was in compliance with the Helsinki Final
Act; the committee defeated the amendment 11-2. 154
Senator Helms considered proposing an amendment which would
have asserted that the U.S. retained the right to supply Israel with non-
nuclear intermediate-range missile assistance. 155 Senator Helms pro-
posed an amendment which would have asserted that the treaty banned
the flight-testing of ICBMs at INF ranges. 156 The committee defeated
the amendment 14-2. 157
Senator Helms offered an amendment which would have required
146. Id. Part 6 at 24-25.
147. Id. Part 6 at 27-28.
148. Id. Part 6 at 33.
149. Id. Part 6 at 36.
150. Id. Part 6 at 41-42.
151. Id. Part 6 at 46- 47.
152. Id. Part 6 at 47-48, 57-58.
153. Id. Part 6 at 103-04, 117-18.
154. Id. Part 6 at 120, 122-23.
155. Id. Part 6 at 58.
156. Id. Part 6 at 73.
157. Id. Part 6 at 76-77.
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the President to certify the precise number of SS-20s in the Soviet arse-
nal; the committee defeated the amendment 15-2.158
Senator Murkowski considered offering an amendment declaring the
sense of the Senate that any START treaty should preserve the non-nu-
clear cruise missile option for NATO.
159
The committee voted to report the INF Treaty's resolution of ratifi-
cation by a vote of 17-2.160
The Senate's floor debate on the INF Treaty began on May 17,
1988, and was by far the most active legislative debate of any of
America's arms control agreements. The following discussion does not
address the Senate's debate of the treaty interpretation issue, which is
discussed in Part IV.
At the outset of the debate, Senator Helms moved
that Senate consideration of [the INF Treaty] is not in order and that
the document cannot be properly before the Senate because it is not
signed by a person authorized to bind the Soviet state, but is, instead,
signed by a leader of a political party in a foreign state [Mikhail
Gorbachev]. 
16 1
The Senate defeated the Helms motion 91-6.162
Senator Symms proposed an amendment which provided, according
to Senator Symms, that "the treaty does not go into effect until the Presi-
dent can report to the Congress and verify that all Soviet arms control
violations have been corrected and the Soviets are back in compli-
ance." 163 Because the Symms amendment was divided into five parts,
each dealing with a separate treaty obligation, the Senate took five votes:
85-11, 87-10, 86-11, 82-15, 89-8, to defeat the Symms amendment.
164
Senator Helms proposed (and later withdrew) an amendment to cor-
rect typographical errors in the treaty text; Senator Lugar argued that
international law and the rules of diplomacy provided for the ability of
states to change such errors. 165
Senator Humphrey offered an amendment which would have
delayed the treaty from entering into force until NATO had increased its
stockpiles of ammunition and fuel. 166 The Senate defeated the amend-
158. Id. Part 6 at 80-81, 99-100.
159. Id. Part 6 at 124-25.
160. Id. Part 6 at 201.
161. 134 CONG. REc. S6077 (daily ed. May 18, 1988).
162. Id. at S6083-84.
163. Id. at S6283.
164. Id. at S6317-19.
165. Id. at S6322-24.




Senator Helms offered an amendment which would have required
the President to certify the number of SS-20s in the Soviet arsenal before
the treaty could take effect. 168 The Senate voted to table the Helms
amendment 81-13.169
Senator Wallop offered an amendment which he contended would
correct a drafting error in the treaty which arguably permitted the Sovi-
ets to produce INF missile stages as part of the ICBM production pro-
cess. 170 The Senate voted to table the Wallop amendment 68-26.171
Senator Humphrey offered an amendment delaying the treaty from
taking effect until the U.S. and the Soviet Union had ratified a START
treaty. 72 The Senate defeated the amendment 81-5.'73
Senator Helms proposed an amendment to the treaty itself requiring
the destruction of INF warheads.
174
The Senate leadership introduced a cloture motion, prompted by
concerns that Senate debate on the treaty would not end before the pend-
ing Reagan-Gorbachev summit.
175
Senator Helms proposed an amendment to the treaty itself providing
that "the provision of materially misleading and false data ... between
the Parties . . .or any other material breach of this Treaty . . . shall
immediately give the other Party the right to terminate.' 76 The Senate
defeated the amendment 89-9.177
Senator Hollings proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratifi-
cation providing that:
The Senate's advice and consent... is subject to the condition that...
the President shall obtain the agreement of the [U.S.S.R.] to the fol-
lowing reservation:
References in the Treaty to ground-launched cruise missiles [GLCMs]
shall be deemed to be references only to [nuclear-equipped
GLCMs].'
78
The Senate rejected this amendment 69-28.179
167. Id. at S6342.
168. Id. at S6401.
169. Id. at S6422.
170. Id. at S6415.
171. Id. at S6423.
172. Id. at S6436.
173. Id. at S6441.
174. Id. at S6503. The Senate does not appear to have acted on this amendment.
175. Id. at S6503.
176. Id. at S6565.
177. Id. at S6573-74.
178. Id. at S6576.
179. Id. at S6610.
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Senator Murkowski proposed an amendment to the resolution of
ratification declaring the view of the Senate that: (1) the U.S. should rely
on its own national technical means of verification in a future START
treaty, rather than on cooperative verification procedures; (2) START
should not contain further restrictions on conventional cruise missiles;
(3) the President and Congress should agree on the character of and
funding for U.S. strategic forces prior to any START agreement. 18 0 The
Senate agreed to the nonbinding Murkowski amendment by voice
vote. 1 1
Senator DeConcini offered an amendment to the resolution of ratifi-
cation underlining the Senate's view that the Soviets should live up to
international human rights standards; the Senate adopted the amend-
ment by voice vote.'
82
Senator Warner proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratifi-
cation conditioning the Senate's advice and consent on the President's
obtaining the agreement of the Soviet Union that certain diplomatic
notes signed by the treaty negotiators be as binding as the treaty.'8 3 The
Senate approved this amendment 96-0.114
Senator Helms proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratifica-
tion (cosponsored by Senators Byrd, Dole, and Simpson) which would
have declared the view of the Senate that the U.S. would pursue START
and CFE agreements guided by certain principles, including close consul-
tations with NATO, close consultations with the Senate, and an empha-
sis on strict verification regimes. The amendment also included that
arguably contradictory declarations that:
(e) In accordance with the Constitutional process of the United States,
the United States shall . . . not be bound [by] any treaty . . . until
ratification thereof pursuant to the advice and consent of the Senate;
(f) ... any joint declaration reached with the [U.S.S.R.] for the negoti-
ation of the treaties contemplated hereby, and such framework itself
... shall not constrain any military programs of the United States
unless otherwise provided for in accordance with Section 33 of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act.'85
None of the sponsoring Senators addressed whether section (f) implied
that the U.S. and Soviets could reach an arms control framework which
could be brought into force through a Congressional-Executive
agreement.
180. Id. at S6613.
181. Id. at S6616.
182. Id. at S6616, 6624.
183. Id. at S6701.
184. Id. at S6723-24.
185. Id. at S6786.
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Interestingly, Senator Gore proposed a second-degree amendment
to this amendment which omitted any reference to section 33. Senator
Gore told the Senate:
I have no objection . . . to reiterating the provisions of existing law.
But I submit that the proposed [Helms] amendment is substantially
broader in the scope of its language than is the law to which it refers.
There is a nontrivial difference between the amendment's stricture that
the President may 'not constrain any military programs of the United
States,' and the law's formulation which is limited to actions that
would 'disarm or reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of
the United States."18 6
Senator Gore proceeded to argue that, in the hypothetical instance of a
President proposing a moratorium on nuclear testing, such a moratorium
(which would "arguably" not amount to such a limitation on U.S. arma-
ments) would not fall within the coverage of section 33, but would fall
within the terms of the Helms amendment.18 7 Senator Cranston then
withdrew his second degree amendment from consideration. 88 The Sen-
ate rejected a motion to table this Helms amendment 60-38.189 Senator
Helms later offered a modified version of his amendment (which retained
the language quoted above), and produced a letter from Legal Adviser
Sofaer concerning the amendment.190 Senator Helms then made the fol-
lowing statement:
[T]here have been press reports suggesting that some sort of frame-
work for a START agreement will in fact, be announced in Moscow
during the summit. The [amendment] also makes clear that any such
framework shall be viewed by the U.S. Government as advisory only
with respect to negotiations only and will not constitute a commitment
nor constrain [sic] any military program of the United States unless
specifically provided for in accordance with section 33 of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act. In other words ... a clear-cut statute
enacted subsequent to the declaration, or a ratified - a ratified -
treaty. '
9
The Senate approved the amendment 94-4.192
The Helms amendment may have simply been the product of hasty,
last-minute draftsmanship. Still, the amendment and the accompanying
debate indicate Senate acceptance of the proposition that some types of
arms control limitations, for instance, those outlined in negotiating
frameworks, may be given the force of law through the procedure out-
186. Id. at S6787.
187. Id. at S6787-88.
188. Id. at S6791.
189. Id. at S6793.
190. Id. at S6897.
191. Id. at S6898.
192. Id. at S6902.
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lined in section 33-namely, Congressional-Executive agreements. Sena-
tor Cranston's stated reasons for omitting reference to section 33 in his
second degree amendment do not undermine this reading of the Senate's
action, and Senator Helms's floor statement supports this reading.
Senator Wallop offered an amendment to the resolution of ratifica-
tion regarding U.S. policy in the event of Soviet noncompliance with the
INF Treaty, and requiring the President to report regularly to Congress
on such matters.1 93 The Senate tabled the amendment 66-30.194
Senator Wilson proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratifica-
tion providing the following:
CONDITION. - The United States shall not be bound to any inter-
pretation of this Treaty that is not equally binding on the Soviet Union
under applicable international law.195
The Senate voted to table the Wilson amendment 53-45. 196
Senator Pressler offered an amendment to the resolution of ratifica-
tion conditioning U.S. ratification of the treaty on the President's certifi-
cation that the Soviet Union was in compliance with the Helsinki Final
Act; the Senate tabled the amendment 86-10.1
97
Senator Symms offered, and then withdrew, an amendment relating
to how OSIA personnel should be counted within the context of the de-
fense budget. 198
Senator Dole offered an amendment to the resolution of ratification
requiring the President to certify that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have
reached an agreement regarding the production of ground-launched bal-
listic missiles which could have similarities to INF missiles; the Senate
accepted the amendment by voice vote.' 99
Finally, Senator Helms proposed an amendment providing for the
withdrawal from Europe of U.S. dependents, the limitation of U.S.
troops' tours of duty in Europe, and the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces
from Europe after implementation of the treaty, out of concern that as a
result of the treaty the Soviets would overrun Western Europe. The Sen-
ate rejected the amendment by voice vote.2°° The Senate approved the
INF Treaty's resolution of ratification 93-5.
201
193. Id. at S6794.
194. Id. at S6877.
195. Id. at S6805.
196. Id. at S6809.
197. Id. at S6878, S6881.
198. Id. at S6881-83.
199. Id. at S6883-84.
200. Id. at S6902-04.




The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty marked
the culmination of nearly two decades of negotiations concerning the
levels of non-nuclear armaments in Europe. By the time the United
States and twenty-one other nations had signed the completed treaty on
November 19, 1990, the Warsaw Pact had begun to disintegrate and the
Soviet threat had all but ceased to exist.
President Bush submitted the treaty to the Senate for its advice and
consent on July 9, 1991; after the United States and the Soviet Union
reached an agreement in June, 1991 resolving conflicts concerning dis-
crepancies in Soviet-supplied data on Soviet force levels, Soviet interpre-
tation of counting rules, and the pre-ratification transfer of Soviet
weapons from Eastern Europe to positions east of the Urals.
SFRC held hearings on the CFE Treaty and unanimously approved
a resolution of ratification on November 19, 1991. The resolution of rati-
fication contained five conditions binding upon the executive branch and
four declarations which expressed the sense of the Senate.
1. Conditions
a. Treaty-Limited Equipment
The Soviet Union insisted in early 1991 that certain equipment as-
signed to its naval forces was not covered by Article III of the treaty. All
other parties to the treaty disputed this Soviet position. The conflict was
resolved at a ministerial meeting attended by all the states parties on
June 14, 1991. At this ministerial meeting, the Soviet Union made a
legally binding commitment to act in accordance with the mainstream
interpretation of the treaty with respect to these disputed naval forces;
however, the Soviets were not required to repudiate their interpretation
of Article III directly.
The SFRC attached a condition to the resolution of ratification pro-
viding that the United States "shall regard [Soviet actions inconsistent
with the June 14, 1991 agreement] as equivalent under international law
to actions inconsistent with the CFE Treaty. ' 20 2 In its report, the SFRC
stated that
the committee intends to make clear that this side agreement has the
same force and effect as the Treaty .... The committee believes there
is no sound constitutional argument for not seeking Senate approval of'side' agreements reached prior to final Senate consent to ratification,
insofar as such agreements affect the obligations of parties to a treaty
202. 137 CONG. REC. S17,845 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991).
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before the Senate. 20 3
b. Data
The concern arose in the Administration and in the Senate in late
1990 and early 1991 that the Soviet Union had falsely declared the
amount of treaty-limited equipment which was stationed in the treaty-
covered zone. The Soviets later issued a political commitment regarding
the number of forces which the Soviets would reduce, and the other par-
ties to the treaty believed this political commitment adequately resolved
the data dispute.
The SFRC attached a condition to the resolution of ratification
which required the United States to "continue to seek clarification [of the
actual number of forces] and... seek to obtain additional reductions [if
the United States learns that a party had in fact underrepresented its
holdings]." 2° 4 The committee stated in its report that "[a]lthough most
administration officials believe that the treaty calls for calculating de-
struction requirements on the basis of each state's declaration, the com-
mittee believes that if Soviet declarations are lower than actual holdings,
the United States should seek to obtain additional reductions. "
20 5
c. Equipment East of the Urals
As political circumstances changed dramatically in 1989 and 1990,
the Soviets withdrew large numbers of conventional forces from the Eu-
ropean theater to positions within the Soviet Union and east of the Urals
(and thus, out of the treaty-covered zone). In response to the expressed
concerns of the United States and other parties that the withdrawn
equipment could enable the Soviets to evade the substance and spirit of
many CFE provisions, the Soviets issued a political commitment on June
14, 1991 to destroy much of this equipment and not to use it as a strate-
gic reserve.
The SFRC attached a condition to the resolution of ratification pro-
viding that the United States "shall regard militarily significant actions
inconsistent with the [June 14, 1991 Soviet statement] as potentially war-
ranting a United States response.., and, in the event of such actions, the
President shall report to the Senate concerning the appropriate United
States response.
'20 6
203. S. ExEc. REP. No. 22, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1991) [hereinafter SFRC CFE Report].
204. 137 CONG. REC. S17,845 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991).
205. SFRC CFE Report, supra note 203, at 70.
206. 137 CONG. REC. S17,845 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991).
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d. Soviet Equipment Temporarily in the Baltics
The CFE Treaty was negotiated before the Baltic states regained
their independence from the Soviet Union. As such, Baltic territory is
treated as Soviet territory under the treaty. In response to the concerns
of the United States and other parties, the Soviet Union agreed to a le-
gally binding commitment to treat all Soviet equipment within the new
states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as treaty-covered equipment.
The SFRC attached a condition to the resolution of ratification pro-
viding that the United States "shall regard actions inconsistent [with this
Soviet commitment] as equivalent under international law to actions in-
consistent with the CFE Treaty. ' 20 7 In its report, the SFRC stated its
belief that
this agreement sets an important precedent for addressing the creation
of new states in the former Soviet Union.... [T]he committee intends
to make clear that this side agreement has the same force and effect as
the Treaty .... More generally, the committee strongly believes that
the increasingly common executive branch practice of setting aside cer-
tain issues for 'side' agreements threatens to undermine the Senate's
coequal role in the treaty-making process. Therefore, the committee
intends as a matter of practice to continue to condition the Senate's
consent to treaties on the understanding that so-called 'side' agree-
ments have the same force and effect as the Treaty to which such
agreements are related.
20 8
e. Area of Application and New States
The SFRC noted in its report that, whereas the Vienna Convention
provides that, in the event of state secession, the new state must continue
to abide by the treaty obligations of the former state, the Third Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law provides that such a new state may opt
not to be bound by its predecessor's obligations. Given the legal and
political uncertainty at the time of the Senate's consideration of the CFE
Treaty, the committee added a condition to the resolution of ratification
which addressed the issue of state secession.
This condition provides that if a new state is formed in the treaty-
covered zone and opts not to be bound by the treaty, the President:
(A) shall consult with the Senate regarding the effect on the Treaty of
such developments;
(B) shall, if he determines that such state's holdings .. .are of such
military significance as to constitute a changed circumstance affecting
207. Id.
208. SFRC CFE Report, supra note 203, at 62-63.
[Vol. 67:645
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL TREA TIES
the Treaty's object and purpose... [call an extraordinary conference]
or undertake other appropriate diplomatic steps;
(C) shall, if he has made the determination described in subparagraph
(B), submit for the Senate's advice and consent any change in the obli-
gations of the states parties... that is designed to accommodate such
circumstance . ..unless such change is a minor [administrative or
technical] matter.
209
The committee stated in its report that it intended the phrase
"changed circumstance" to refer to a situation in which either Ukraine
or Byelorussia refused to be bound by the treaty, or a situation in which
Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan all refused to be bound.
210
Secretary of State Baker wrote the SFRC that "the Administration
intends to implement the condition... in good faith and in the spirit in
which it was negotiated. ' 21' Specifically, Secretary Baker stated that the
refusal of Ukraine or Byelorussia to be bound by the treaty would in all
likelihood be considered a "changed circumstance." Secretary Baker ad-
ded that
[i]f, in order to accommodate such a changed circumstance resulting
from the emergence of a new state, Treaty participants were to agree to
a 'change in the obligations' through a legally-binding side agreement,
rather than a Treaty amendment, the Administration would submit
such agreement to the Senate for advice and consent, just as it would
an amendment to the Treaty.212
2. Declarations
a Accession
The committee attached a declaration to the resolution of ratifica-
tion expressing the sense of the Senate urging "the President to seek the
accession to the Treaty by any new state that may in the future be formed
in the [treaty-covered zone]."' 213 This declaration was intended to apply
to new states which formed in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet
Union.
b. Treaty Interpretation
As a result of the ABM Treaty reinterpretation dispute, the commit-
tee attached a declaration to the resolution of ratification in which "[tihe
Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally-based
principles of treaty interpretation set forth in condition (1) in the [INF
209. 137 CONG. REC. S17,845 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991).
210. SFRC CFE Report, supra note 203, at 59.
211. 137 CONG. REC. S17,869 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991).
212. Id.
213. Id. at S17,845.
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Treaty's] resolution of ratification. '214
c. Congressional-Executive Agreements
To underscore the Senate's opposition to the conclusion of arms
control agreements as Congressional-Executive agreements, the commit-
tee attached the following declaration to the resolution of ratification:
The Senate declares its intent to approve international agreements that
would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the armed forces or
armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner only
pursuant to the Treaty Power as set forth in Article II, Section 2,
Clause 2 of the Constitution.21
The Senate's opposition to the use of Congressional-Executive agree-
ments in arms control was amplified in the SFRC's CFE Report:
In attaching this declaration, the committee intends to make clear that
it will consider militarily significant agreements only as treaties. The
prominent case in point is the recently signed bilateral agreement on
chemical weapons. That agreement imposes a permanent ban on the
production of chemical weapons. As such, it is a militarily significant
agreement that should be a treaty, and the committee intends to con-
sider it as such if it is forwarded to the Senate. This declaration thus
serves to put the administration on notice that it should proceed hence-
forth to any agreement on chemical weapons as a treaty.21 6
A striking feature of this declaration is that it closely tracks the lan-
guage in section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act,21 7 except
in two key respects. The first respect, of course, is that section 33 on its
face countenances the approval of arms control agreements as Congres-
sional-Executive agreements. Secondly, and more interestingly, section
33 does not contain any language relating to the "military significance"
of arms control agreements. 218 Since there is no statutory or constitu-
tional support for the proposition that "militarily significant" interna-
tional obligations must be concluded as Article II treaties, and since the
historical record on this point is decidedly mixed, the validity of the Sen-
ate's declaration springs only from the Senate's political tenacity, rather
than from an authoritative source of law.
214. Id.
215. Id. at S17,846.
216. SFRC CFE Report, supra note 203, at 71.
217. See supra Part II(A).
218. In fact, § 33 arguably creates an altogether different significance threshold-the section
only requires that arms control agreements which "reduce" or "limit" United States armed forces
receive the endorsement of Congress. Therefore, under the terms of § 33, militarily significant agree-
ments such as the Hotline Agreement, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement, or agree-
ments providing for the advance notification of strategic exercises need not receive any congressional
approval.
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d. Compliance and START
Finally, the SFRC attached a declaration to the resolution of ratifi-
cation in which the Senate declared that it will consider Soviet resolution
of two previous, sticky arms control compliance issues (the INF Treaty's
SS-23 dispute and the ABM Treaty's Krasnoyarsk radar dispute) when it
evaluates a future START agreement.
2 19
3. Floor Action
Senator Cohen offered the following amendment to the fifth condi-
tion in the resolution of ratification:
[I]f no such change is agreed to by all state parties but the President
determines nonetheless that continued adherence to the Treaty would
serve the national security interests of the United States, [the President
shall] seek the Senate's advice and consent to such continued
adherence .... 220
After some debate, Senator Cohen proposed a modification to his amend-
ment, which required only that the President "seek a Senate resolution of
support to such continued adherence .... ,"221 Senators Biden and Cohen
indicated that the President would not be legally bound by such a Senate
resolution.2 22 Senator Biden stated that the modified Cohen amendment
had the support of the Administration;2 23 the Senate then approved the
Cohen amendment by voice vote.
224
Senator Smith offered a condition to the resolution of ratification
providing that
[t]he United States shall not be bound by the terms of this Treaty un-
less and until the Congress has received.. . the President's Soviet Non-
compliance with Arms Control Agreement report and the President
has certified through the report that the Soviet Union is not in viola-
tion or probable violation of the terms of the CFE Treaty and proto-
cols thereto. 22
5
Senator Smith later offered a modified version of this amendment which
required a presidential compliance report but did not condition United
States adherence to the treaty on the report; the Senate approved the
modified amendment by voice vote.2 26 The Senate approved the CFE
219. 137 CONG. REC. S17,846 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991).
220. Id. at S17,855.
221. Id. at S17,868.
222. Id. at S17,870.
223. Id. at S17,869
224. Id. at S17,871.
225. Id. at S17,881-82.
226. Id. at S18,033.
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Treaty's resolution of ratification by a vote of 90-4.227
IV. THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE AND CONGRESS IN THE
INTERPRETATION AND TERMINATION OF TREATIES
Once a treaty has been ratified, the President has the power to inter-
pret it, unilaterally or in agreement with treaty partners, pursuant to the
President's foreign affairs power. 228 On the other hand, the President
may not agree to amend a treaty in a major respect, or to conclude major
supplemental agreements not contemplated by the treaty, without Senate
or congressional approval. In addition, the President normally does not
commit the interpretation of treaties to third-party dispute resolution,
such as arbitration or adjudication by the International Court of Justice,
without Senate or congressional acquiescence or approval. Moreover, if
the President changes an earlier treaty interpretation, Congress may use
its legislative and appropriations powers to force the President to
reconsider.
The reinterpretation controversy involving the ABM Treaty is a
good example of this phenomenon. 229 When the President sent the ABM
Treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification as an Arti-
cle II treaty, Executive branch officials told the Senate that the treaty
prohibited the development and testing of space-based ABM systems
based on "other physical principles" than those existing in 1972, such as
lasers. Thirteen years later the Reagan Administration "reinterpreted"
the treaty to permit the development and testing of those space-based
ABM systems. However, several senators, former officials who partici-
pated in the treaty negotiation, and many academic commentators vigor-
ously disputed the Administration's case. Congress used its legislative
and appropriation powers to force the Executive branch to limit develop-
ment and testing of ABM systems to activities permitted under the origi-
nal interpretation.
In the Senate deliberations, two questions were raised: (1) whether
the ABM Treaty properly interpreted would permit development and
testing of space-based ABM systems, and (2) whether there are constitu-
tional limits on Presidential interpretation power. In 1987 the Senate
227. Id. at S18,038.
228. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (THIRD)
§ 326 (1987). Domestic courts will give "great weight" to Executive branch interpretations. Id.
229. For discussions of this issue, see the Symposium, Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1353 (1989); GLENNON, supra note 9 at 134-45. This Part has been adapted from
Phillip R. Trimble, The Constitutional Common Law of Treaty Interpretation: A Reply to the For-
malists, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1461 (1989).
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considered, but declined to adopt, S. Res. 167,230 which provided that
"during the period in which a treaty is in force, the meaning of that
treaty is what the Senate understands the treaty to mean when it gives its
advice and consent. . ".. ,,231 In his opening statement at the hearing on
the resolution Senator Biden explained that "during the life of the treaty
the Constitution permits ... only that interpretation [as presented by the
executive branch and as understood by the Senate], unless the treaty is
formally amended with the advice and consent of the Senate. '232 S. Res.
167 reflected a stark assertion of senatorial prerogative. In support of the
effort to prevent the President from reinterpreting the ABM Treaty to
permit testing exotic ABM systems in space, S. Res. 167 would have
entrenched all treaty interpretations "as understood by the Senate" at the
time of consent to ratification; the President could not suggest differently
unless he received a new, formal Senate consent (presumably by an af-
firmative vote of two-thirds of the Senators present).
The Reagan Administration responded with the Sofaer Doctrine.
According to this Doctrine, a particular interpretation would be perma-
nently binding if it were "authoritatively shared with, and clearly in-
tended, generally understood and relied upon by, the Senate at the time
of its advice and consent to ratification. ' 233 The Sofaer Doctrine clearly
was intended to give the Executive branch more latitude, although in
retrospect it is difficult to understand why the Administration would
have conceded that any interpretation would ever be permanently bind-
ing. In any event, the concepts under both S. Res. 167 and the Sofaer
Doctrine are so vague that it is far from clear that the two formulations
would necessarily produce different results in practice. "Generally un-
derstood" and "understood" are not necessarily different. Any formal
communication to the Senate could easily be regarded by an interpreter
to be "clearly intended" to contribute to the Senate's understanding.
And any statement received from the Executive in a Senate hearing could
reasonably be presumed to be "relied upon." In the end the Senate re-
jected both S. Res. 167 and the Sofaer Doctrine. In the hearings, the
230. S. Res. 167, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in The ABM Treaty and the Constitu-
tion, Joint Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. and the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 229-37 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings].
231. S. Res. 167, § 2(2)(A), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 230. The remaining relevant provi-
sions of S. Res. 167 said that, in the absence of any Senate understanding on a particular point, the
treaty is properly interpreted by a reference to the "text, as reasonably construed, in light of its
object and purpose." Id.
232. Hearings, supra note 230.
233. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., THE INF TREATY, S.EXEC. REP. No. 15, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 443 (1988) [hereinafter INF REPORT] (Culvahouse letter); see also 134 CONG. REC.
S6740-44 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (Sofaer speech).
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original language of S. Res. 167 was criticized on legal grounds by Sena-
tors Lugar and Helms and by two private commentators. 234 The private
commentators specifically argued that interpretations may change over
time, in response to new conditions and subsequent practice. Both pri-
vate commentators called attention to the role of Senate acceptance of
subsequent practice as a way of legitimizing a reinterpretation.
S. Res. 167 as reported reflected a significant change from the origi-
nal language. It provided that the meaning of a treaty provision "is to be
determined in light of what the Senate understands the treaty to mean
when it gives its advice and consent. ' 235 The majority language in the
Committee Report, however, clung to the original idea that "the mean-
ing of the treaty that the President ratifies is the meaning on which there
existed a meeting of the minds between the President and the Senate at
the time of Senate consent. ' 236 It quoted former Chairman Fulbright to
the effect that "a law means what its framers intended it to mean and not
what a later generation of policymakers would like it to mean .... ,,237
On the other hand, Senator Helms characterized this part of the Com-
mittee Report as an attempt to "rewrite constitutional law."' 238 He ex-
plained that "[s]ubsequent practice gives to the Chief Executive the right
to adjust the implementation of a treaty. '239
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to report S. Res.
167, as amended, favorably by a vote of 11-8.240 Since the Resolution
dealt with the substantive law of the ABM treaty as well as with the
constitutional law of treaty interpretation, it is impossible to know
whether some Senators may have agreed with the initial interpretation of
the ABM Treaty, but may have disagreed with (or may have not had a
view on) the constitutional principles contained in the Resolution, or vice
versa. Such are the vagaries of legislative intent. In any event, the Sen-
ate did not take action on the Resolution, but Congress did-infor-
mally-frustrate the Reagan reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty by
limiting appropriations for SDI.24 1 Thus, Congress imposed its view of
the substantive law of the ABM Treaty, but did not express its view on
the constitutional principles of treaty interpretation. The Senate inaction
234. See Hearings; supra note 230, at 179-82 (Senator Helms); id. at 182-83 (Senator Lugar); id.
at 86-87 (Professor Baldwin); id. at 192-95 (Mr. Rovine).
235. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION RESOLU-
TION, S. REP. No. 164, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1987) (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 39.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 69.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 37. A Helms substitute motion failed by a vote of 9-10.
241. Pub. L. No. 101-189. § 232.
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was apparently part of a political compromise under which the Reagan
Administration agreed to conform to the narrow interpretation of the
ABM Treaty and the Senate agreed to "temporarily forego legislation
that endorses the restrictive view of the treaty. '242 By declining to act on
the Foreign Relations Committee recommendation, the Senate arguably
laid the foundation for a negative implication to the effect that it did not
wish to endorse the constitutional law principles embodied in S. Res.
167, as amended.
The Biden Resolution, S. Res. 167, and the constitutional issues,
however, were not dead. Its proponents tried to win Senate endorsement
of its constitutional doctrine on two subsequent occasions. First, in con-
nection with the popular INF Treaty, the Biden Resolution, S. Res. 167,
was revived as a proposed condition to that Treaty.243 The Biden Condi-
tion embodied the old entrenchment principles: the United States shall
not agree to an interpretation of a treaty different from the original un-
derstanding except by formal Senate consent. The purpose of the Biden
Condition was "to articulate and affirm . . . constitutional principles"
that "reflected a time honored [constitutional] practice."' 2 " The Biden
Condition was directed "to the maximum degree possible" to the INF
Treaty, but it was also designed to "affirm principles that inherently apply
to the INF Treaty. '245 Some commentators objected that the Senate
cannot change the Constitution by a unilateral resolution or condition.
The Committee responded by stating that it was necessary in the context
to register its non-acquiescence to the Sofaer Doctrine. Thus the Biden
Condition, "paradoxically . . . [was] both unnecessary and highly
significant. 2
46
The Biden Condition specifically provided that the INF Treaty
"shall be subject to the following principles, which derive, as a necessary
implication, from the provisions of the Constitution (Article II, Section
2, Clause 2) for the making of treaties .... -247 The Committee's attempt
to secure Senate approval of this general statement of constitutional law
was once again unsuccessful. On the floor of the Senate, a substitute
condition, now called the Byrd amendment, 24 8 deleted the language
quoted above that indicated that the entrenchment principles were gen-
242. Michael R. Gordon, Nunn Says Record on the ABM Pact is Being Distorted, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1987, at A14.
243. See INF REPORT, supra note 233, at 97, 436.
244. Id. at 96.
245. Id. at 97.
246. Id.
247. Id. The Condition then set forth the original entrenchment principles of S. Res. 167.
248. See 134 CONG. REC. S6724 (daily ed. May 26, 1988).
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eral principles of constitutional law. Instead, entrenchment principles
were applied as a condition to the INF Treaty, and were by their terms
limited to that treaty.
The change was intentional and significant. During the Foreign Re-
lations Committee deliberations, Senator Cranston, who took over lead-
ership of this issue in the absence of Senator Biden, proposed three
versions of the Biden Condition to Senator Lugar. Lugar rejected all
three. Cranston then "introduced the toughest of the three, including the
claim of constitutional authority, giving himself room to negotiate when
the treaty reached the full Senate. ' 249 As the debate on the Senate floor
moved toward consideration of amendments and conditions, "Cranston
said that he and Pell would be willing to remove the reference to consti-
tutional authority from the language. ' 250 This is exactly what happened.
The entrenchment provisions embodied in the Condition were no longer
said to "derive, as necessary implications, from the provisions of the
Constitution." Instead, the Senate adopted a "condition, based on the
Treaty Clauses of the Constitution," to the effect that the original under-
standing of the INF Treaty-and only that Treaty-would be en-
trenched. 25' Once again, the Senate deliberately-and as part of a
political compromise-declined to endorse the general "constitutional
principles" embodied in S. Res. 167 and the Biden Condition.
Nevertheless, despite the language change, several Senators in the
floor debate maintained that the revised Condition would still have the
effect of making a general statement about constitutional law; in other
words, a statement in favor of formal entrenchment. That view, how-
ever, was not the only view expressed by supporters of the Byrd
amendment, and it is therefore not necessarily indicative of Senate intent.
Fourteen Senators spoke in favor of the Byrd amendment. Eight inter-
preted the amendment to represent a general statement, while two others
seemed to accept that it had no effect beyond the INF Treaty. Other
supporters did not address the question. There obviously was no single
view among the supporters who spoke as to the correct meaning or
message of the Byrd amendment.
Only two Senators directly addressed the effect of the language
change from the original Biden Condition. Senator Lugar, who both par-
249. Rudy Abramson, Democrats Ready to Compromise on Key INF Issue, Cranston Says, L.A.
TIMES, May 20, 1988, pt. 1 at 16.
250. Id.
251. The reference to the Treaty Clauses of the Constitution may still seem ambiguous. Literally
it could either mean that the substance of the Condition was based on constitutional law, or it could
mean that the Senate's action-procedurally-was based on the Constitution. Since the former would
render the language change meaningless, the latter seems correct.
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ticipated in the discussions leading to the compromise language in the
amendment and voted for the amendment, offered the following view:
I rise to ask Senators to vote for the Byrd substitute. I do so
having participated in the discussions with the distinguished majority
leader, with colleagues on both sides of the aisle representing the For-
eign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees, and of
course, our Republican leader, Senator Dole.... I hoped this particu-
lar amendment would not be necessary on the INF Treaty. Indeed, I
described the entire operation as a mistake, in my judgment. I suspect
that each one of us tries to determine what is relative and what is im-
portant, and it is apparent to me that a number of colleagues believe
this matter is very important. Indeed, the majority leader has pointed
out that in his judgment the role of the Senate in the treaty-making
process is the most important factor superseding even perhaps the
treaty we are discussing.
I would say, Mr. President, that my judgment about these matters
is somewhat reversed. I come to a conclusion of support for this
amendment because I believe the INF Treaty is very important, and it
is apparent to me that the passage of this treaty would have been diffi-
cult within the time period which we are talking about without accom-
modation of colleagues listening to one another.
252
Senator Dole, another participant in the compromise discussions and a
reluctant supporter of the amendment, echoed similar sentiments:
As I have discovered over the years, there are about three ways in
this body to deal with disagreements.
We can argue and argue and argue, ad infinitum; and produce
little but an especially fat edition of the Congressional Record. Or we
can put down our honest differences in pretty stark form, and then
vote - up or down, winner take all.
Or, finally, we can look for compromise. It seemed to me after
several hours of meetings that was our only real choice, if we wanted
to get this treaty done, without a truly dangerous and damaging
amendment attached to it ....
I want to correct any misunderstanding. The White House is not
supporting this compromise .... They wanted some changes. They
wanted some changes we did not give. Some of the changes were
made: compromise.
So I think if I had my way this amendment would not be on this
treaty. I do not think it even belongs here. But I know who is in the
majority and I know where the votes are and I knew that the majority
leader felt strongly about this issue on one side. Many others felt
strongly on the other side .... And so we did the best we could. The
result, to me personally, is far from the best solution; again, I suggest
that I am not the constitutional scholar. But to me, sincerely, it is the
best we can achieve.
We ended up with a better result than we started with. The ma-
252. 134 CONG. REC. S6771 (daily ed. May 26, 1988).
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jority leader and others on that side were willing to make some conces-
sions. I think one key provision and one addition was what we call
subsection (4) ....
That provision makes clear, at least it does to me, that the deci-
sion we are making on this treaty applies solely to this treaty and does
not prejudice our position on the ABM interpretation issue at all ....
It is my understanding, based on the conversations-and I do not
believe I missed much of any of the meetings, that was pretty well the
feeling of most participants, Republicans and Democrats-that was
the effect of that subsection (4).253
Perhaps significantly, in his response to the Dole statement that con-
cluded the debate, Senator Byrd focused his constitutional arguments on
the INF Treaty alone.
254
In the debate, therefore, there was no single or clear explanation of
the language change. Many voices spoke. Some continued to see an af-
firmation of general constitutional principles. Others viewed the debate
as another version of the ABM Treaty dispute. Still others opposed the
general principles embodied in the original Biden Condition, but went
along with the compromise in order to get the INF Treaty approved in
time for the Moscow summit. Even supporters of the original Condition
were willing to give up Senate endorsement of general constitutional
principles in order to avoid delaying the INF Treaty, a politically untena-
ble position for arms control supporters. Hence the compromise referred
to by Senators Lugar and Dole. The most plausible inference is that the
Senate decided to avoid a general constitutional statement. They en-
trenched the original understanding of the INF Treaty; but did nothing
else. 2
55
Unfortunately the debate did not reflect much discussion of the re-
lated question of how an entrenched meaning can change. Only Senator
Lugar spoke on this point:
I point out, furthermore, that the checks and balances of our Gov-
ernment still work, and I appreciate the frustration of many colleagues
on the other side of the aisle who feel that the current administration
has attempted to reinterpret a treaty. In my own judgment, the cur-
rent administration did not attempt to reinterpret a treaty. The ambi-
253. Id. at S6781-82.
254. Id. at S6782-83.
255. The next day Senator Specter offered an amendment to the effect that neither the Biden
Condition, as amended, nor the Foreign Relations Committee Report on the INF Treaty would
change existing constitutional law. That amendment was rejected, by a vote of 64-33, arguably
creating a negative implication that the Senate did seek to change constitutional law. Nevertheless,
the four Senators who spoke in opposition seemed to regard this amendment merely as a threat to
the earlier compromise reached on the Byrd amendment and as means of reviving the Sofaer Doc-
trine. At least two also interpreted it as an attempt to elevate the status of international law over the
constitutional law of the United States. See id. at S6890-91.
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guity at least in the ABM Treaty has been cited by the administration
as a basis for interpretation. But let us take the worst case, that the
current administration deliberately took a look at a proposition that
both the Senate and the President had looked at and went entirely in a
different direction. In truth, Mr. President, we have in front of us the
actual political history of the past two years, and that is the majority
party in the Senate has not agreed with the interpretation of the Presi-
dent of the United States of how we ought to develop the SDI pro-
gram, and as a result that program has either been stymied or has been
tailored to fit the will of the majority.
Now, I have not agreed with the tailoring or the stymieing, but
nevertheless, I recognize that in our political system this is the way it
works. In short, even if a President should attempt to reinterpret a
treaty, the checks and balances of the legislative-executive relationship
check any exercise of arbitrary judgment or arbitrary authority.
Therefore, Mr. President, I saw no particular reason to try to pin
all of this down 15 different ways. It seems to me the system works
adequately as it stands .... 256
Nevertheless, persistence paid off. In connection with the CFE
Treaty, discussed above, the Senate adopted a declaration incorporating
the INF Condition and stating that it applied to all treaties. This declara-
tion, while not purporting to be legally binding, is noteworthy because it
states a Senate position on treaty interpretation which the Senate had
declined to adopt when the issue was hotly disputed over the ABM
Treaty and the INF Treaty. The INF Treaty Condition referred to in this
declaration applied only to the INF Treaty; the CFE declaration refers to
"all treaties." Although it is not binding, this declaration represents a
political triumph for Senator Biden and his allies who were unable to
prevail before. The record does not reflect discussion of the precise issue,
and the President, although a vocal proponent of Presidential power,
does not seem to have noticed. Nevertheless, this Senate action, when
considered with its declaration regarding the form of the Chemical
Weapons Agreement, shows the strong propensity of the Senate to de-
fend its constitutional prerogative.
After all the controversy little is settled. Most commentators would
probably agree that the President may not reinterpret fundamental treaty
provisions in major respects, even with the agreement of a treaty partner,
without seeking Senate or congressional consent. Such a change would
properly be classified as a "major amendment" to the treaty and, as such,
would require that consent. The record of Senate deliberations of arms
control treaties reflects clear Senate concern that its role not be ignored
in amendments contemplated by approved treaties. As to supplemental
256. 134 CONG. REC. S6771 (daily ed. May 26, 1988).
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agreements contemplated by a treaty they would seem to be implicitly
approved, and that seems to have been uncontroversial. It would also
seem that minor reinterpretations, as well as minor amendments, could
be made by the President with Senate or congressional acquiescence. If
Congress disagrees with a Presidential interpretation, it may reflect its
non-acquiescence through its legislative or appropriations power. Fi-
nally, conditions formally adopted, like that to the INF Treaty, should
bind the President if he chooses to ratify the treaty.
Another area of recent controversy concerns the termination of trea-
ties. President Carter terminated an Article II defense treaty in accord-
ance with its terms, despite a "sense of the Congress' expression that he
should consult with Congress before any such change in policy. In Gold-
water v. Carter257 the Supreme Court dismissed a complaint filed by
some members of Congress to enjoin the Presidential action. The plural-
ity opinion invoked the political question doctrine. Since that time the
President has claimed the right to terminate Article II treaties in accord-
ance with their terms. Congress has acquiesced. The President has also
successfully asserted the right to declare a treaty partner to be in "mate-
rial breach" of its terms, so that the United States may withdraw from
the treaty. Finally, the President has successfully asserted the right to
violate the terms of a treaty or other norms of international law in the
course of conducting the nation's foreign relations, at least in the absence
of Congressional action prohibiting such a violation. Those rights are
based on the President's foreign affairs power.
V. CONCLUSION
The formal record which we have reviewed shows that individual
Senators on many occasions have sought to defend senatorial prerogative
in the treaty-making, treaty-interpretation, and treaty-termination pro-
cess. However, the Senate as a body has not endorsed these efforts, but
rather has conceded an equal role to the House of Representatives in
treaty-making, and has been most effective in influencing treaty interpre-
tation through use of the legislative and appropriations powers. With
respect to substantive influence on arms control, the Senate has rarely
adopted formal conditions to negotiated agreements, but instead has
served as a forum for expressing conservative opposition to arms control
and dealing with the Soviet Union, as well as for reinforcing support for
robust military spending programs. This conservative influence has per-
257. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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vasively, if indirectly, influenced U.S. arms control policy. The effect has
been conservative and cautionary.
For the future it would seem that arms control, and especially arms
reduction, should be as important as ever. In light of the end of the Cold
War, the need to reduce arms in a stable and predictable manner, and to
unprecedented degrees, is especially urgent. To that end, it seems desira-
ble to reconsider the use of the Article II process for arms control trea-
ties. We have demonstrated that the Congressional-Executive agreement
is a legitimate constitutional alternative under a normal legal analysis.
There are more fundamental reasons as well to shift to the Congress as a
whole. Much attention has recently been devoted to the role of princi-
ples of democracy in constitutional interpretation.258 Such an approach
strongly suggests more use of Congressional-Executive agreements in lieu
of Article II treaties. There are many theories of democracy, but the
Senate has a weak claim to decision-making authority under any version
of democratic theory. 259 Its supermajority requirement in treaty-making
gives a minority (one third plus one) of Senators the ability to veto a
treaty. Minority power is further enhanced by the potential use of the
filibuster that can only be overcome by another supermajority. Rural
and conservative constituencies are disproportionately favored by the
composition of the Senate and can block agreements that are preferred by
a national majority or that are desirable in the President's and Congress's
long-term view of the national interest. The termination of the defense
treaty with Taiwan illustrates the point. The President's decision to ter-
minate the treaty and to proceed with the normalization of relations with
China could have been frustrated by a minority of conservative Senators
if a two-thirds vote of the Senate were required to terminate the treaty.
Historically, agreements dealing with arms control have been sub-
mitted to the Senate as Article II treaties. Today, however, arms reduc-
tion may have as much domestic effect as foreign policy relevance. The
reduction of the standing army would have a substantial effect on jobs
and communities. Because this domestic environment is increasingly im-
portant in terms of the actual effect of arms control, it now seems espe-
cially appropriate to conclude these agreements as Congressional-
Executive agreements.
Perhaps the Senate's Article II modern role should focus on agree-
ments that deal with matters of special interest to the states as states,
258. Eg., Louis HENKIN, CONST1TUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990).
259. See Phillip R. Trimble, Foreign Affairs Law and Democracy, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1371, 1380
(1991).
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such as private international law treaties whose principal effect is to
change state law, and perhaps some human rights treaties that, to the
extent that any change in law is required, primarily affect state law (like
the racial discrimination convention).
Professor Henkin endorses more House involvement and suggests
that the House and Senate establish a committee to work out a division
of authority between Article II treaties and Congressional-Executive
agreements. Such an approach would require the Senate to look at these
issues primarily in terms of its Article II prerogative in the abstract, di-
vorced from the politics of particular agreements. It seems doubtful that
the Senate would readily agree to surrender authority not yet explicitly
lost. Perhaps the more realistic approach is for the President to take the
initiative with particular agreements, and to push toward more Congres-
sional-Executive agreements as President Bush has done with the U.S.-
Soviet Chemical Weapons Agreement.
